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MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THEOLOGY,

OR, THE

Exiſtence of GOD

Geometrically Demonſtrated.

In THREE BOOKS.

WHEREIN IS PROVED,

The Exiſtence of GOD from Eternity to Eternity; his Self-exiſtence, Independency, and Unity. That GOD is infinite in Wiſdom, Power, Knowledge, &c.

ALSO,

That MATTER is a temporary Being; that GOD is the Cauſe of its Exiſtence, and of the Exiſtence of all other Beings, that ever did, or can exiſt; and upon GOD the Continuation or Termination of their Exiſtence depends.

BY

RICHARD JACK,

Teacher of MATHEMATICKS.

LONDON:

Printed for G. HAWKINS at Milton's Head, Fleet-ſtreet, MDCCXLV

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

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HUGH Earl of *Marchmont.*

MY LORD,

PErmit me to take this opportunity of publickly acknowledging the many favours you have been pleaſed to confer upon me, a ſtranger to your Lordſhip, till by the infatuation of men rebelling againſt their lawful Sovereign, I was drove from my native country,

A 2 rendered

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rendered deſtitute of all probable means of ſupport, and ruined by the reſentment of the rebels, for readily ſerving his Majeſty to the utmoſt of my ability, when his forces were attacked at *Seaton*. In that diſtreſs your Lordſhip's friendſhip was my only comfort; your character, to which I was not a ſtranger, gave me indeed a title to your protection, as the beſt recommendation to you, is ſuffering in the cauſe of liberty, and of the proteſtant ſucceſſion; that was my introduction to your Lordſhip,

that

that procured me your friendſhip, which I ſhall ever value as my greateſt happineſs.

The work which I preſent to your Lordſhip, has alſo ſome title to your favourable acceptance, the ſubject of it is important; a demonſtration of the exiſtence of the fountain of truth, muſt be acceptable to a perſon who is an eminent lover of truth; your Lordſhip's wonderful proficiency in mathematical knowledge, which I admired whilſt I had the honour of reading mathematicks with you, ren-

ders you the fitteſt patron of the following geometrical demonſtrations.

If they have the happineſs to meet with your Lordſhip's approbation, I need be under no apprehenſion of any cenſure from the publick. I am

Your Lordſhip's
moſt obliged,
and moſt obedient
humble ſervant,

London, Oct. 7.
1746.

RICHARD JACK.

PREFACE.

ALthough the knowledge of truth, in itſelf highly valuable, be difficult to attain, yet every man, who ſeriouſly reflects upon what paſſes within himſelf, muſt acknowledge, that he is poſſeſſed of faculties, by the due exerciſe whereof he may acquire it; ſuch as thought, perception, and the power of comparing ideas, and of determining, in purſuance of ſuch compariſon, or the faculties of reaſoning and judging.

How man came to be endued with thoſe faculties, may appear perhaps

not ſo eaſy to determine, but if a very ſimple maxim be allowed, which no man in his right ſenſes ever denied,

That nothing exiſts without a cauſe, *it will neceſſarily follow, that thoſe human faculties are owing to ſome being, and ſince we diſcover in ourſelves no power capable to produce them, we muſt aſcribe them to ſome other exiſting being able to beſtow them.*

If we alſo take a view of all around us, and obſerve the immenſity, harmony, and beautiful variety diſplayed in the univerſe, from the moſt ſtupendous fabrick to the ſmalleſt microſcopical inſect, each of them proclaiming power, wiſdom, and deſign in their author; how prepoſterouſly abſurd would it be to imagine, that man had faculties beſtowed upon him,

him, far exceeding the properties of inanimate beings, ſurpaſſing the variegated beauties of the fineſt vegetables, or the exquiſite ſtructure of the ſmalleſt inſects, without any deſign in the giver, or uſe in the exerciſe of them; ſince then the Creator of man has inveſted him with ſuch noble powers, it is his duty to employ them to the beſt purpoſes.

It is true, our bountiful Creator has given us alſo a will, whereby we may chooſe the object for the exerciſe of our faculties, but he has given us reaſon too, in order to direct our choice, and conduct us in the purſuit of ſuch ends as terminate in ſolid pleaſure and laſting happineſs. And what excites more pleaſing ſenſations? what inſpires with more elevated thoughts? what more enlarges thoſe thoughts,

thoughts, than a diligent inquiry after truth? Nothing is more beneficial to man, nothing tends so directly to his lasting happiness, as the knowledge of truth.

By the impartial search after truth, we are made acquainted with our frailties and imperfections, we discover wherein our conceptions are erroneous; to that we owe our knowledge of the arts and sciences, so eminently beneficial to mankind; but above all, from thence we may have the existence and attributes of the benevolent Creator of all things demonstrated to us; he gave and continues our existence, upon him we depend, and in him we ought to place our only confidence; it is from his infinite adorable perfections alone that we can hope for lasting happiness.

The

The discovery of truth then being of the utmost importance to man, both with respect to his condition here, and his state hereafter, it is certainly the most proper, if not the only proper subject of our thought and inquiry; nature incites us to the search, and rewards our thirst after knowledge with the highest satisfaction when we attain it; the applause too, which usually attends every discovery according to the useful consequences of it, is perhaps no slight motive to excite men to inquire; a new construction of a mathematical problem, or demonstration of a theorem, is eagerly embraced by the learned, and the author esteemed, though perhaps few useful consequences attended it, fewer still were foreseen by the discoverer, and some remained undiscovered by

the

the learned who applauded him. How much more excellent and praiſe-worthy muſt that enquiry be, which has the demonſtration of the exiſtence of Almighty God for its end, and a permanent impreſſion of his being and attributes on the minds of men for its conſequence? ſince by the firm belief of that great truth we enjoy proſperity and ſupport affliction; from the conviction of his exiſtence, and the knowledge of his government, delight, chearfulneſs, and conſolation flow; hope is given here, and hereafter never ceaſing happineſs.

But the greater the benefit ariſing from the knowledge of any truth is, the greater caution ſhould be uſed in inquiring after it, every ſtep muſt be attentively conſidered, that the mind may be compelled to aſſent to every pro-

propoſition, each demonſtration muſt be clear and perſpicuous, and the concluſions drawn juſtly and certainly.

Truth is only attainable by ſlow ſteps, of this all mathematicians are ſenſible, men who with impartiality and the utmoſt caution have ſtudied it; all their geometrical diſcoveries have proved, that truth is known only by degrees; the care and attention theſe men uſe in inveſtigating the moſt plain and ſimple truths is apt to ſurpriſe others, there no party prejudices, no views of private intereſt take place; they ſearch for truth alone, and embrace it wherever they find it.

It would have been happy for mankind, if the metaphyſicians had obſerved the ſame method in their enquiries, then they could not have impoſed upon the world and themſelves,

ſelves, nor have drawn fallacious concluſions from uncertain premiſes; their principles muſt have been demonſtrated, and the many miſchiefs occaſioned by their failure in proving theſe principles, would have been avoided.

That mathematical concluſions are certain, and metaphyſical conſequences doubtful, is not ſo much owing to the different nature of the demonſtrations, as to the different methods taken in their proſecution; mathematicians begin with affixing names to particular things, and conſtantly apply theſe names to the ſame things; metaphyſicians not only differ amongſt themſelves in the explanation of their terms, but uſe the ſame terms in different ſenſes upon different occaſions, rendering them ambiguous at all times.

Meta-

Mathematicians next proceed to axioms, or self-evident truths, carrying conviction with them, and from thence to propositions, plain and simple in their nature, and enuntiated with precision, until they have obtained a clear apprehension of a sufficient number of truths to enable them to investigate those originally in view, but difficult to demonstrate; carefully avoiding ambiguity in their expressions, and every thing which does not arise from the hypothesis, construction, or a preceding definition or axiom in their demonstrations: they never rashly hurry to any proposition, nor precipitately involve themselves in a difficult or intricate demonstration of any abstruse truths, although they had them in view from the beginning, and they were the end of their enquiry.

quiry. Thus it becomes impoſſible for mathematicians to impoſe upon the world; thus knowledge is obtained with certainty, and every poſſible miſtake or error may, with the utmoſt facility, be diſcovered and removed.

But in metaphyſicks the caſe is far otherwiſe, thoſe who have hitherto employed themſelves in that ſtudy, generally affect more precipitation than attention, and in the very outſet bewilder themſelves in propoſitions dark, difficult, and complicated, the expreſſions not preciſely known, and without any previous ſteps fitted to found a demonſtration upon; where definitions or axioms are uſed, they are of no ſervice to the diſcovery of truth by the ambiguity of the expreſſions, and the various ſenſes in which they are underſtood and applied, conſequently

ſequently the firſt ſtep in a demonſtration built upon them becomes fallacious, every ſubſequent propoſition is equally defective, and no concluſion can be relied upon which is deduced from this pompous but erroneous appearance of reaſoning. Hence ſome men have been emboldened to undertake the defence of the moſt abſurd principles; immenſe metaphyſical volumes wrote as anſwers, amount only to tedious wrangling about the different ſenſes each writer has been pleaſed to affix to certain ſounds, whilſt truth and knowledge are buried or forgot, and ſcience itſelf is brought into diſrepute.

That even ſome metaphyſicians are conſcious of thoſe imperfections, is manifeſt from their writings; one great inſtance may be obſerved in the per-

formance of a very learned and eminent author, who attempts to prove the non-existence of matter after the manner of metaphysicians, to convince the world by a metaphysical satyr, either that there is nothing too absurd to be demonstrated by that method of writing, or that no demonstration of any truth is to be expected from it.

As the geometrical method of enquiry is universally allowed to be the most just, it has been thought by learned men that it would be a great advantage to mankind if any means could be found to adapt it to morality. Mr. Locke thought morals so evidently demonstrable, that he says, the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused if their discourses in morality be not much more clear

than

than thoſe in natural philoſophy. But when we find that diſtinct writer afterwards doubting his ability to perform that ſervice to the world†, and conſider the diverſity of opinions ſtill prevailing (perhaps more than could be imagined) upon moral queſtions of the higheſt concernment, we might be induced to ſuſpect that it was not poſſible to apply geometrical reaſoning to moral ſubjects, notwithſtanding the great opinions to the contrary, when really the neglect of that method hitherto is only to be attributed to the difficulty of finding a proper medium for applying geometrical demonſtration to moral truths. For if a being really does exiſt, to ſay the exiſtence of that being cannot*

* Locke Hum. Und. B. 3. Chap. 11. §. 16. 17.

† Locke's Letters.

be truly demonſtrated, is indirectly to deny that it does exiſt, and to contend that the moſt juſt method of demonſtration is not applicable to the nature of that being, amounts to this abſurdity, that truth may be ambiguouſly demonſtrated, but not juſtly.

If we purſue with ſlow attentive ſteps the path which nature points out to us, we may be aſſured we ſhall be conducted to a juſt concluſion, and find the means to demonſtrate in the ſtricteſt manner the exiſtence of what really does exiſt; for every thing exiſting is endued with properties ſuited to its nature, and by the knowledge of thoſe properties we diſtinguiſh one being from another; and therefore if by fitting concluſions from a juſt demonſtration, we can acquire the knowledge of the properties of any being,

we

we discover the existence of that being.

That nature is most uniform and simple in all her operations, is an axiom allowed by all philosophers, and since we have been enabled to arrive at the knowledge of the distinguishing properties of many beings, and to demonstrate some truths geometrically, if by continuing the same tract there be one other existing being, whose properties we cannot learn, nature must cease to be uniform in her operations contrary to the axiom, or that existing being must have no properties, which is absurd.

To believe a stop put to the acquisition of knowledge, is shocking to the mind of man, which naturally thirsts after knowledge; to think that because a thing has not yet been done, it is impossible to reach it,

seems

ſeems an indolent ſubmiſſion to ignorance, in which it is happy for us our predeceſſors did not acquieſce.

There are innumerable inſtances, where an honeſt endeavour to diſcover truth has brought it to light with ſuch ſhining marks, as rather to ſurpriſe us that it was not ſooner found, than that it was diſcovered ſo late. All truths are in their exiſtence equal, the reaſon why one is admitted, another queſtioned, is not that one truly exiſts and not the other, but becauſe one has been pointed out to us by ſuch plain ſtriking ſteps, as to compel our aſſent, and the other attempted to be ſhewn by means dark and uncertain, leaving the mind heſitating and in ſuſpence, till unable to diſcover ſteps to prove it equally plain and perſpicuous with the former; it ſubſides into a diſbelief of

its

its exiſtence, and thence ſpring thoſe controverſies which diſtract the minds of many, and eminently diſturb the happineſs of ſociety.

Theſe conſiderations excited me to apply my thoughts to a geometrical demonſtration of morality, convinced that nothing could be of more uſe to mankind than the ſucceſs of ſuch an undertaking, and in the proſecution of my deſign I have obſerved the ſtrict demonſtrating method of Euclid, and have endeavoured to be equally juſt and perſpicuous.

In what I now offer to the publick, I have (as it was neceſſary I ſhould, in treating of morals,) demonſtrated the exiſtence of the ALMIGHTY GOD, BLESSED FOR EVER, *that he is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, that he from all eternity did,*

did, and to all eternity will exiſt. I have demonſtrated his unity, infinite in power, wiſdom, knowledge, and juſtice, &c. That matter is a temporary being, and that GOD is the cauſe of its exiſtence, as he is the cauſe of the exiſtence of all other beings which ever did or can exiſt; and that upon GOD their exiſtence depends.

Upon theſe great truths are morals founded, and if this method of treating that ſubject meets with approbation, I ſhall be encouraged to proceed with the remaining parts demonſtrated in the like manner; but if it ſhould pleaſe GOD to diſpoſe things ſo as to diſable me from the performance, I hope this attempt will excite other geometricians to improve upon the thought, and apply themſelves to a ſubject ſo deſerving our ſerious attention,

tion, and ſo conducive to the happineſs of mankind, and then we may hope to ſee our moral principles as clearly demonſtrated as the principles of geometry.

Before I conclude, it is neceſſary to inform the reader, that I have been obliged in ſome places to cite The doctrine of proportion geometrically demonſtrated, *which I intended to have publiſhed at* Edinburgh *before the preſent work; but the late wicked and unnatural rebellion having forced me to leave my native country, and the rebels having pillaged my houſe, the manuſcript of that book was, with my other effects, taken away, or deſtroyed. I hope therefore the reader will excuſe my citing*

that manuſcript, as it is not in my power to offer it to the publick until it is wrote again, which I hope ſoon to be able to do.

ERRATA.

Page	Line	
21.	14.	in the margin, *read* ax. 4.
38.	9.	*dele* it.
44.	3.	*for* dependent of B. *r.* dependent upon B.
102.	16.	*dele* is the cauſe.
119.	7.	in the margin, *r.* ax. 3. Ditto l. 15. in the margin, *r.* ax. 3.
120.	18.	in the margin, *r.* ax. 3.
127.	6.	*after* them, *r.* in the ſame time
130.	17.	in the margin, *r.* ax. 3.
135.	10.	*for* B. *r.* C.
140.	7.	in the margin, *r.* ax. 3.
155.	17.	*after* alone, *r.* and is deſtroyed by the conjunct acting of both powers.
161.	6.	*for* C's power, *r.* B's power.
170.	4.	in the margin, *r.* ax. 9. l. 1.
171.	15.	*r.* prop. 10. of this.
176.	7.	*r.* C D.
178.	5.	*r.* C D.
240.	1.	*r.* determining.
260.		*dele*, D, F, E, in the fig. to prop. 6.
263.	16.	*r.* of beginning the exiſtence of any one dependent being.
290.	9.	*r.* the being B.
311.	14.	*r.* of ſome other being.

THE

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Geometrically Demonstrated.

BOOK I.

DEFINITIONS.

I. *ANY thing, that ever was, is, or can be, is said to* have existed, to exist, *or* will exist.

II. *A* being *is any thing, that ever did, does, or will exist.*

III. Being *is the ſame with exiſtence.*

IV. *The* limits *of any thing, are its utmoſt ends, or boundaries.*

V. Finite, *is that which has certain and determined limits, or boundaries.*

VI. Hypotheſis, *is what is allowed, or ſuppoſed to be, or to exiſt.*

VII. Aſſigned, *is the ſame with given: Therefore when any thing is ſaid to be aſſigned, the ſame is underſtood, as if that had been ſaid to be given.*

VIII. Infinite, *is greater than any finite that can be aſſigned, or it is that*

that which has no limits or boundaries.

IX. Body, *is what is ſolid, extended, and capable of motion.*

X. Space, place, *and* time, *are divided into abſolute and relative.*

XI. Abſolute ſpace, *is ſuch as is extended, ſimilar, and immoveable, whoſe parts cannot be ſeparated, nor even diſtinguiſhed from one another.*

This definition of ſpace, is ſuppoſing it different from matter or body. For, if we ſuppoſe all exiſtent matter annihilated, the immenſe ſpace which it did poſſeſs, will remain the ſame after the annihilation, as it was before.

And since it is conceived to consist in extension alone, it evidently will be similar in all its parts. Neither can it be moveable, nor its parts separated; because that would necessarily suppose it endowed with the attribute of solidity, to make it capable of receiving an impressed force, in order to excite that motion, or separation of its parts, of which in this definition it is supposed to be void.

Neither can its parts be distinguished from one another, because the different parts of any being, are only presented to our senses, by the interposition of some signs or marks; but space consisting only of extension, none of its parts can be distinguished, by our senses, but by the interposition of some bodies, which we must make use of

of as marks or ſigns to diſtinguiſh its parts by. But thoſe parts of ſpace, which lie between two or more bodies, or are poſſeſſed by body, conſtitute relative, and not abſolute ſpace, as will appear from a following definition.

Whether a being conſiſting of extenſion only, exiſts in nature or not, does not affect this definition, it being ſufficient that we can form to ourſelves an idea of ſuch a being.

This definition *exactly correſponds with that of* a circle, a ſquare, a triangle, *&c. given us by* geometricians, *who define them by their properties, without informing us whether they actually exiſt or not; and as it ſuffices, for them to form an idea of theſe figures, from their properties by which they define them; ſo it is equally ſufficient for us to form an idea of* abſo-

lute space, *from its properties by which it is here defined.*

XII. Relative space, *is either that part of absolute space, which any body possesses, and in this respect it is the same with absolute place; or it is that particular part of absolute space, which lies between two or more bodies. This last species of relative space, will not always remain the same; for if the distance and position of the bodies to which it relates be encreased or diminished, then will the relative space be also increased or diminished.*

Although bodies containing equal quantities of matter, will possess equal spaces, however they may differ in their form or figure, yet the ambient space contiguous to their bounding surfaces will not be the same. Thus two bodies,

bodies, each containing a quantity of matter equal to 10 *cubic feet, the one in the form of a cube, the other in that of a ſphere, will poſſeſs equal ſpaces; but the ſpace ambient to their ſurfaces, will be different, as the ſurfaces are of different figures.*

Wherefore relative ſpace *may juſtly be defined to be the meaſure of abſolute ſpace, by the means of body, ſince it is by body that any part of abſolute ſpace is determined.*

XIII. Abſolute place, *is that particular part of abſolute ſpace, which a body poſſeſſes.*

The abſolute place of a body is always the ſame in magnitude, though it is not neceſſary for it always to be the ſame numerically.

For if we suppose the earth to move, the space it occupies, will always be the same in magnitude; but as it continually changes its place, by its motion, therefore it must pass through different parts of absolute space, and consequently cannot have the same place numerically.

XIV. Relative place, *is that part of space, which we perceive any body to possess, with respect to its situation, position to, and distance from any other body.*

Hence it follows, that a body may constantly change its absolute place, and its relative place may remain the same; that its absolute place may remain the same, and its relative place be perpetually changing, or both may constantly change.

For

For firſt, if we ſuppoſe a paſſenger on board a ſhip, and the ſhip in motion, but he at reſt, his relative diſtance and poſition with reſpect to all the parts of the ſhip, will remain the ſame; conſequently he will retain, with reſpect to theſe parts, the ſame relative place; but the ſhip being in motion, he will, in common with her, conſtantly change his abſolute place.

Again, let us ſuppoſe the ſun at reſt, and his abſolute place the ſame; but the planets moving round him in ellipſes's, at different diſtances, with different degrees of velocity; the ſun then will be conſtantly changing his diſtance and ſituation to them, and conſequently changing his relative place, whilſt his abſolute place is the ſame, becauſe he is fixt.

That a body may change both its abſolute and relative place is ſo obvious, that it needs no illuſtration.

XV. Duration, *or* abſolute time, *is ſuch as conſtantly flows with the ſame equable tenor, without any reſpect, or relation, to the motion of any body whatſoever. Wherefore, if all the bodies in the univerſe, from the creation, had been abſolutely at reſt, the ſame duration, that has paſſed, would have elapſed, independent of the motion of exiſting bodies, or of their reſt, and even of the exiſtence of bodies themſelves.*

And ſince duration would have exiſted, proceeding in its regular ſucceſſive order, whether theſe had exiſted or not, therefore duration is ſimilar in all its parts. And as a mathematical

tical line is conceived to be generated, by the motion of a mathematical point, and bounded with points; ſo any finite part of duration may be conceived to be generated, by the uniform flowing of a point of duration, and bounded by points of duration.

XVI. A point of duration, *is what conſtitutes no part of duration, however ſmall; but is only the limit or boundary of a part of duration. For as a mathematical point is defined to be what has no length, and can only be conceived to be the limit or boundary of a mathematical line, and an infinite number of them cannot conſtitute length; ſo a point of duration may in the ſame manner be juſtly defined, to be what conſtitutes no part of duration, but is only the limit or boun-*

dary of a part of duration, and an infinite number of them cannot make up any part of duration.

XVII. Relative, *or* apparent time, *is a finite part of duration considered as bounded by points of duration, and has the same relation to absolute time, that relative space has to absolute space; and therefore it may be defined to be the measure of duration, by the means of body. For as the different parts of space, cannot by our senses be distinguished without the interposition of some body; for the same reason the different parts of time cannot be perceived but by the interposition of some body, which we may suppose moving with a regular and uniform motion; so that the motion of the body corresponds, and is proportional*

tional to the different parts of duration, and by this means time may be determined. Thus we meaſure the particular part of time, that any body continues in the ſame place, whether that place be abſolute or relative; or that part of time which any body takes, to move from any determined place to another, with an uniform and equable Motion.

XVIII. Eternity, *is infinite duration, or time, greater than any time that can be aſſigned.*

XIX. *The* naſcent exiſtence *of any being, is that point of duration in which its exiſtence begins.*

XX. *The* evaneſcent exiſtence *of any being, is that point of duration, in which its exiſtence terminates or ends.*

XXI.

XXI. *A being, antecedent to whoſe naſcent exiſtence a point of duration can be aſſigned, is a* temporary being.

XXII. *An* act *of any being is the exertion of that power, by which it preſſes upon, or influences itſelf, or any other being.*

XXIII. *An* effect, *is the conſequence ariſing from any being preſſing upon, or influencing itſelf, or any other being, in any manner whatſoever.*

XXIV. *A being is ſaid to be* inſtrumental *in producing an Effect, when it acts in conjunction with ſome other being for the production of that effect.*

XXV.

XXV. *The* cauſe *of an effect, is a being preſſing upon, or influencing itſelf, or any other being, whereby that conſequence or effect is produced.*

XXVI. *A* ſelf-exiſting being, *is ſuch whoſe exiſtence is independent of all other beings whatſoever.*

XXVII. *A* dependent being, *is a being whoſe exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being.*

XXVIII. *The* mind, *is that being, which is capable of thinking, perceiving, judging, and reaſoning.*

XXIX. *An* idea, *is any being which exiſts in the mind.*

XXX.

XXX. *An* agent, *is a being which acts, and is the cauſe of an effect.*

XXXI. *Agent is divided into* animate *and* inanimate, free *and* not free.

XXXII. *An* abſolutely free agent *is a being ſelf-exiſting, and acting at all times, without the influence of any other being whatſoever.*

XXXIII. *A* relative free agent, *is a being which is not ſelf-exiſting, but may act without the immediate influence of any other being.*

XXXIV. *A* dependent *or* ſecondary agent, *is a being which is neither ſelf-exiſting, nor at any time can act,*

act, without the influence of ſome other being.

XXXV. *An* animated agent *is, any being that can receive ideas, whether abſolutely or relatively free, or even dependent.*

XXXVI. *An* inanimated agent *is, a being which can receive no ideas, and upon all occaſions, times, and circumſtances, is a dependent or ſecondary agent.* is no agent at all, but rather a passive instrument of action

XXXVII. *A being is ſaid to* act, *when it preſſes upon, or influences itſelf or any other being, in any manner whatſoever.*

XXXVIII. *That power is ſaid to* terminate *the exiſtence of any being,*

which acting upon the being, will deſtroy the effect ariſing from the exertion of the power whereon its exiſtence depends.

AXIOMS.

I. *NOthing hath no properties.*

II. *No effect can be produced without a cauſe.*

III. *Effects produced are in proportion to the cauſes that did produce them.*

IV. *Every being exiſts in all the points of time, or duration in which it acts.*

V.

V. *The* * *conſequence of any action,* * Def. 23.
is both poſterior in time and in our ideas, to the action itſelf.

VI. *No being can exiſt and not exiſt at the ſame time.*

VII. *Every being which contains another being, is greater than that which it contains, and this holds equally with reſpect to ſpace and duration.*

That is, any ſpace is greater than another ſpace contained within it.

And any duration is greater than that time, whoſe bounding points of duration are within it.

VIII. *Any being may exiſt in all the points of duration, in which it is acted upon, by the exertion of that*

power on which its exiſtence depends; nothing acting in oppoſition to it, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

That is, if the life of any animal depends upon the regular circulation of the Blood, and Secretion of other juices, ſo long as the animal is actuated by that regular motion and ſecretion, nothing acting upon the animal to deſtroy their effects, the life of the animal may be continued.

IX. *The exiſtence of any being cannot both be dependent, and independent of the ſame being.*

X. *The exiſtence of every being is either dependent, or independent of ſome other being.*

XI. *Effects are dependent upon the cauſes which produced them.* XII.

XII. *Two equal contrary powers or cauſes preſſing upon or influencing the ſame being in the ſame point of duration, mutually deſtroy each other's effect.*

PROPOSITION I.

THEOREM I.

A being cannot act before it exiſts.

FOR, if it was poſſible for any being to act before it exiſted; then, becauſe every being exiſts in every point of duration in which it acts *, therefore in the time that the act was performed, it muſt have exiſted. But by the hypotheſis, at that time it had no exiſtence, where-

* Ax. 4.

fore it will both exiſt and not exiſt
† Ax. 6. at the ſame time, which † is abſurd.

Therefore, *a being cannot act before it exiſts*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM II.

The exiſtence of the cauſe of any effect is antecedent to the exiſtence of that effect.

* Def. 23. BEcauſe that effect * is the conſequence ariſing from that being, which is the cauſe of it, preſſing upon, or influencing itſelf, or any other being; wherefore that preſſing upon, or influence, will be antece-
† Ax. 5. dent to the effect †; and ſince that preſſing

preſſing upon, or influence, is the acting of the being ‡, that being, therefore, will act antecedent to that effect. But every being exiſts in all the points of duration in which it acts ‖, conſequently that being will exiſt prior to that effect. But that being is the cauſe of the exiſtence of that effect §.

‡ Def. 22.

‖ Ax. 4.

§ Hypoth.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of the cauſe of any effect, is antecedent to the exiſtence of that effect*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION III.

THEOREM III.

A being cannot be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence.

FOR, let A be any being, I ſay, that A cannot be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence. For if it be poſſible for A to be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence, then will the exiſtence of A be an effect produced, by the acting of the being A, in conjunction with ſome other being *, which let be B. Then will that conjunct acting of the beings A and B, be the cauſe of the exiſtence of A. But the exiſtence of the cauſe of any effect is antecedent

* Def. 24

to

to the exiſtence of that effect †, where- † Prop. 2.
fore the conjunct acting of the beings A and B, will be antecedent to the exiſtence of A, and conſequently A will act antecedent to its own exiſtence, and therefore will act before it exiſts, which is abſurd ‡. ‡ Prop. 1.

Therefore, *a being cannot be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION IV.

THEOREM IV.

The exiſtence of any temporary being, is dependent on ſome other antecedent exiſting being.

FOR, let A repreſent any temporary being; I ſay, that the exiſtence of A, is dependent on ſome other being

A ⊙

being that exiſts antecedent to it; for, if the exiſtence of A, be not dependent on ſome other being that exiſts antecedent to it, it will either be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence, or not; but no being can be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence *: Therefore the being A, cannot be inſtrumental in its own exiſtence. Now becauſe the exiſtence of the being A, is neither dependent on ſome other antecedent exiſting being, nor can be produced by itſelf; then will the exiſtence of A, be an effect produced without a cauſe, which is abſurd †. Wherefore ſince the exiſtence of A, is an effect, which is owing to ſome cauſe, and it is demonſtrated, that that cauſe cannot be itſelf, it will be owing to ſome other being. But the exiſtence of that cauſe is antecedent

* Prop. 3.

† Ax. 2.

to

to the exiſtence of the effect *; wherefore the being that is the cauſe of the exiſtence of the being A, will exiſt antecedent to A, and conſequently the exiſtence of the temporary being A, is dependent on ſome other antecedent exiſting being. * Prop. 2.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any temporary being, is dependent on ſome other antecedent exiſting being*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION V.

THEOREM V.

A time cannot be aſſigned in which nothing exiſted.

FOR, if it be poſſible to aſſign a time wherein nothing exiſted, the exiſtence of the firſt being, ſince it

§ Def. 21. it must be a temporary being §, will be dependent on some other antece-
* Prop. 4. dent existing being *. But by the hypothesis no being exists, consequently it will be possible, for the existence of a temporary being, to be independent on any antecedent exist-
† Prop. 4. ing being, which is absurd †.

Therefore, *a time cannot be assigned in which nothing existed*, which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION VI.

THOREM VI.

Some being existed from all eternity.

FOR, if no being existed from all eternity, then may a time be assigned in which nothing existed,
‡ Prop. 5. which is absurd ‡.

There-

Therefore, *ſome being exiſted from all eternity*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION VII.

THEOREM VII.

A time cannot be aſſigned antecedent to an infinite time paſt.

FOR, if it be poſſible to aſſign a time antecedent to an infinite paſt time, then will that interval of time, intercepted between the firſt point of duration of the time aſſigned, and the laſt point of duration, that paſſes when we conceive it, be an aſſigned finite duration*. * Def. 5.

And becauſe the firſt point of duration of that aſſigned time, is antecedent to the infinite paſt time†, † Hyp.

and the point of duration that paſſes at the conception of it, is poſterior to the ſame infinite paſt time; therefore the infinite paſt time will be contained within the boundaries of that aſſigned finite time. But every being is greater than that other being which it contains within it *, equally in reſpect to ſpace and duration; conſequently that aſſigned finite time, will be greater than the infinite paſt time: a finite greater than an infinite, which is abſurd †. From this abſurdity it follows,

* Ax. 7.

† Def. 8.

That *a time cannot be aſſigned antecedent to an infinite paſt time*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION VIII.

THEOREM VIII.

A time cannot be aſſigned poſterior to an infinite time to come.

FOR, if it be poſſible, to aſſign a time poſterior to an infinite time to come, then will that interval of time intercepted between the laſt point of duration, of the time aſſigned, which is poſterior to the infinite time to come, and the laſt point of duration that paſſes when we conceive it, be an aſſigned finite duration *. * Def. 5.

And becauſe that laſt point of duration that paſſes at the conception of it, is antecedent, and the laſt point of duration of the aſſigned time, is

posterior to the infinite time to
* Hyp. come * ; therefore the infinite time to come, will be contained within the boundaries of that assigned finite duration. But every being is greater than that other being it contains within it, both with respect to space
† Ax. 7. and duration †.

Wherefore that assigned finite duration will be greater than an infinite time to come, and consequently a finite will be greater than an infinite,
‡ Def. 8. which is absurd ‡.

Therefore, *a time cannot be assigned posterior to an infinite time to come*, which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION IX.

THEOREM IX.

A time cannot be aſſigned, either antecedent or poſterior, to infinite time paſt and to come.

LET AB, repreſent an infinite time paſt and to come, and C, the point of duration that paſſes at the conception of it, then will CA, repreſent the infinite time paſt, and CB, will repreſent the infinite time to come. Wherefore becauſe CA, is infinitely continued backward *, no time can be aſſigned antecedent to A †; Alſo becauſe CB is infinitely continued forward‡, no time can be aſſigned poſterior to B§.



* Hyp.
† Prop. 7.
‡ Hyp.
§ Prop. 8.

But it has been already proved, that no time can be assigned antecedent to A, and now it is demonstrated, that no time can be assigned posterior to B, consequently no time can be assigned either antecedent or posterior to the time A B. But A B represents infinite time past and to come.

Therefore, *a time cannot be assigned, either antecedent or posterior, to an infinite time past and to come*, which was to be demonstrated.

Coroll. From hence it follows, that no time can be assigned, either antecedent or posterior to eternity past and to come. Because eternity is infinite time*; therefore eternity past and to come, will be the same thing with infinite time past and to come.

* Def. 18.

And

And as a time cannot be aſſigned either antecedent or poſterior to infinite time paſt and to come *; conſequently no time can be aſſigned either antecedent or poſterior to eternity paſt and to come.

* Prop. 9.

PROPOSITION X.

THEOREM X.

Any being, whoſe exiſtence depends upon any other being, will, in ſome manner, be preſſed upon, or influenced by that other being.

FOR, let A be a being, whoſe exiſtence depends upon ſome other being, which let be B; I ſay, that the being A, will, in ſome manner, be preſſed upon, or influenced

A ⊙
B □

fluenced by the being B. For since the existence of the being A depends
* Hyp. upon the being B*, the existence of A, will be an effect whereof the be-
‡ Ax. 11. ing B is the cause‡. But an effect is the consequence, that arises from any being pressing upon or influencing
† Def. 23. itself, or any other being†; wherefore the existence of the being A, is owing to the being B pressing upon, or influencing it; consequently the being B does press upon or influence the being A.

Therefore, *any being, whose existence depends upon any other being, is, in some manner, pressed upon or influenced by that other being*, which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XI.

THEOREM XI.

Any being, whoſe exiſtence depends on any other being, cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of that other being.

FOR, let the exiſtence of the being A depend on the being B; I ſay, that it is impoſſible for A to exiſt, without the exiſtence of B. For ſince the exiſtence of A depends on the being B †, the continuation of A's exiſtence is an effect whereof B is the cauſe; but an effect is the conſequence that ariſes from any being preſſing upon, or influencing itſelf or any other being *, where- * Def. 23.

† Hyp.

wherefore the continuation of the being A's exiſtence, is owing to the being B, preſſing upon or influencing it, and conſequently the whole time that A exiſts, it will be preſſed upon or influenced by B. Again, if we ſuppoſe the exiſtence of B to be terminated, and A continue, if poſſible, to exiſt, after it it is impreſſed, or influenced by the laſt exertion of that power in B, at its evaneſcent exiſtence, then will A continue to exiſt independent of B, or will continue to be preſſed upon or influenced by it. But A cannot exiſt independent of B, for if it could, the exiſtence of A would be independent of B, which is abſurd *.

* Hyp.

Neither can it be preſſed upon or influenced by B, for if it could, then every

every being exiſting in all the points of duration in which it acts *, the being B would exiſt poſterior to its evaneſcent exiſtence, and conſequently would both exiſt, and not exiſt at the ſame time, which is abſurd †. Wherefore ſince the being A cannot exiſt independent of the being B, nor can be influenced or preſſed upon by it after its exiſtence is terminated, the being A will not at all exiſt after the exiſtence of the being B is terminated, and conſequently A cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of B.

* Ax. 4.

† Ax. 6.

Therefore, *any being, whoſe exiſtence depends upon any other being, cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of that other being*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XII.

THEOREM XII.

The existence of any being, that cannot exist, without the existence of some other being, depends on that other being.

LET A be a being which cannot exist, without the existence of some other being, as B; I say, that the existence of the being A is dependent on B.



For the existence of A does either depend on the being B, or not; and first, if possible, let the existence of A not depend on the being B: Then because the existence of the being A, is an effect, it will be owing

ing to ſome cauſe *, which cauſe * Ax. 2.
will therefore either be itſelf, or ſome other being different from the being B: Conſequently the exiſtence of A will be dependent on the preſſure, or influence of itſelf, or ſome other being for the continuation of its exiſtence.

Let therefore the exiſtence of the being B, be ſuppoſed to be terminated: Then because the exertion of that power, on whoſe preſſure, or influence, the exiſtence of the being A depends, is not exerted by the being B †, therefore the being A may be actuated by that preſſure, or influence, on which its exiſtence depends, poſterior to the terminating of the exiſtence of the being B.

A ⊙
B □

† Hyp.

But any being may exiſt in all the points of duration in which it is actuated

ated by that preſſure, power, or influence on which its exiſtence de-
* Ax. 8. pends *, nothing being here ſuppoſed to deſtroy that effect; therefore the being A, may exiſt poſterior to the exiſtence of the being B, that is, it may exiſt without the exiſtence of
† Hyp. B, which is abſurd †. Wherefore the exiſtence of the being A, can neither be dependent on itſelf, nor any other being different from B.

Conſequently the exiſtence of A will either be dependent on B, or upon no being whatſoever. If it be dependent on no being, then will A be a ſelf-
§ Def. 26. exiſting being §, which is contrary to the hypotheſis, and abſurd.

Therefore, *any being that cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of ſome other being, its exiſtence depends on that other being*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIII.

THEOREM XIII.

Any being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of another being, may exiſt without the exiſtence of that other being.

LET A and B be any two beings, and let the exiſtence of the being A, be independent of the being B.

I ſay, that A may exiſt without the exiſtence of B: For A may either exiſt without the exiſtence of B, or not. If the being A cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of B, then becauſe any being that cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of ſome other being,

A ⊙
B □

being, it's exiſtence is dependent on
*Prop. 12. that other being *; therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent of B, which
† Hyp. is abſurd †. Wherefore the being A can exiſt without the exiſtence of the being B.

Therefore, *any being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of another being, may exiſt without the exiſtence of that other being*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIV.

THEOREM XIV.

Any being, that can exiſt without the exiſtence of another being, its exiſtence is independent of that other being.

LET A and B be any two beings, and let A be ſuch a being, as can exiſt without the exiſtence of B. I ſay, that the exiſtence of A, is independent of B: For the exiſtence of A will either be dependent on B, or not. Let the exiſtence of A, if poſſible, be dependent of B. But any being, whoſe exiſtence depends on another being, cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of that

A ⊙
B □

that other being*. Therefore the being A cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of the being B. But A § can exiſt without the exiſtence of B, conſequently the exiſtence of A is both dependent, and independent of the ſame being B, which is abſurd†. Wherefore the exiſtence of A is not dependent on B; and therefore is independent of it.

*Prop. 11.

§ Hypoth.

† Ax. 9.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any being, that can exiſt without the exiſtence of ſome other being, is independent of that other being*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XV.

THEOREM XV.

A ſelf-exiſting being can exiſt, without the exiſtence of any other being whatſoever.

FOR, let A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting being: I ſay, that the being A can exiſt, without the exiſtence of any other being whatſoever. A ⊙ B □

For, if it be poſſible, let the being A be ſuppoſed not capable of exiſting without the exiſtence of any other being. And let any being be aſſigned, without whoſe exiſtence A cannot exiſt, and let that being be B. Now becauſe A cannot exiſt without

without the exiſtence of B*: But the exiſtence of any being, that cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of ſome other being, is dependent on that other being†: Therefore the exiſtence of the being A is dependent on the being B. But the being A is a ſelf-exiſting being‡, and therefore its exiſtence is independent of any other being whatſoever‖. Wherefore the exiſtence of A is both dependent, and independent of the ſame being B, which is abſurd§. Therefore the being A may exiſt, without the exiſtence of the being B, and conſequently without the exiſtence of any other being whatſoever.

* This Hyp.

† Prop. 12.

‡ Firſt Hyp.

‖ Def. 26.

§ Ax. 9.

Therefore, *a ſelf-exiſting being can exiſt, without the exiſtence of any other being whatſoever*, which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XVI.

THEOREM XVI.

The exiſtence of any being that is not ſelf-exiſting, is dependent upon ſome other being.

FOR let A be a being, that is not ſelf-exiſting. I ſay, that the exiſtence of A, is dependent upon ſome other being.

Becauſe the exiſtence of every being is either dependent or independent of ſome other being *. Therefore the exiſtence of A, is either dependent upon ſome other being, or not. A ⊙ * Ax. 10.

If the exiſtence of A be not dependent upon any other being, then will A be a ſelf-exiſting being †, con- † Def. 26.

trary to the hypotheſis, which is abſurd; conſequently the exiſtence of A, is dependent upon ſome other being.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any being that is not ſelf-exiſting, is dependent upon the exiſtence of ſome other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XVII.

THEOREM XVII.

A being which can exiſt, without the exiſtence of every other being whatſoever, is a ſelf-exiſting being.

FOR, let A repreſent a being, which can exiſt without the exiſtence of every other being whatſoever. I ſay, that A is a ſelf-exiſting being.

For,

For, if A is not a ſelf-exiſting being, then will its exiſtence be dependent upon ſome other being *, and let that other being be B. Then becauſe the exiſtence of A is dependent upon the being B; therefore A cannot exiſt without the exiſtence of B †, contrary to the hypotheſis, which is abſurd. Wherefore the exiſtence of the being A, is independent of the being B, and after the ſame manner it may be demonſtrated, that the exiſtence of A is independent of any other being. But a being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of all other beings, is a ſelf-exiſting being ‡; wherefore the being A is a ſelf-exiſting being.

A ⊙
B □

* Prop. 16.

† Prop. 11.

‡ Def. 26.

Therefore, *a being which can exiſt, without the exiſtence of every other*

being whatsoever, is a self-existing being; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

THEOREM XVIII.

A being cannot begin, or continue to exist antecedent to, or without the exertion of that power on which its existence depends.

FOR, let A be any being: I say, it is impossible for A to begin, or continue to exist, without the exertion of that Power, on which its existence depends. For, if possible, let A begin to exist without the exertion of that power; then, because the beginning of A's existence is an effect, and effects are dependent upon the causes that did produce them;

A ⊙

them*; wherefore the exertion of that power on which A's exiſtence depends, is the cauſe of the beginning of its exiſtence; but it begins to exiſt without the exertion of that power†: Therefore the beginning of A's exiſtence will be an effect produced without a cauſe, which is abſurd‡. Neither can A continue to exiſt, without being preſſed upon, or influenced by that power; for if it could, there would ſtill be an effect produced, to wit, the continuation of A's exiſtence without a cauſe, which is abſurd§; and conſequently by the non-exertion of that power, the exiſtence of A will ceaſe.

* Ax. 11.

† Hyp.

‡ Ax. 2.

§ Ax. 2.

Therefore, *no being can begin, or continue to exiſt, antecedent to, or without the exertion of that power on which its exiſtence depends*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XIX.

THEOREM XIX.

The exiſtence of any being may be terminated, or continued, by the exertion or non-exertion of that power that is capable of terminating it.

LET A and B be two beings, and B poſſeſſed of ſuch a power, that can terminate the exiſtence of A; I ſay, that the exiſtence of A, may be terminated or continued, by the exertion or non-exertion of that power, which B poſſeſſes. Becauſe, if A be preſſed, or influenced, by that power which B poſſeſſes, in the ſame point of duration, in which it is actuated, by that power on which its

A ⊙
B □

its exiſtence depends; then will the being A be actuated in the ſame point of duration, by two equal and oppoſite powers, which therefore will mutually deſtroy each other's effect *: Wherefore, ſince the effect that flows from the exertion of that power, by which the exiſtence of the being A is continued, is deſtroyed, the exiſtence of A will thereby terminate; for if it does not, there will be an effect produced, to wit, the continuation of the exiſtence of the being A, without a cauſe, which is abſurd †. Therefore, by the exertion of that power which B poſſeſſes, the exiſtence of A will terminate, and conſequently by the non-exertion of that power, A may be actuated by that power on which its exiſtence depends, nothing then acting in oppoſition to it, ſo as

* Ax. 12. and Def. 38.

† Ax. 2.

to destroy its effect; wherefore the existence of A may be continued *.

* Ax. 8.

Therefore, *the existence of any being may be terminated, or continued, by the exertion or non-exertion of that power that is capable of terminating it*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XX.

THEOREM XX.

The existence of any being, is independent of that being, which cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let B be such a being as cannot be the cause of beginning the existence of A, or act in opposition to that

A ⊙
B □

that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. I ſay, the exiſtence of A is independent of B. For ſince B cannot be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, therefore A may begin to exiſt without the exiſtence of B, and conſequently the exiſtence of A in this reſpect, will be independent of the exiſtence of B. Again, let C be a third being, that can bring A into exiſtence: Wherefore, the beginning of A's exiſtence will be an effect, of which the exertion of that power that C poſſeſſes, is the cauſe *; and ſince B is poſſeſſed with no power in oppoſition to, or that can deſtroy the conſequence that flows from the exertion of that power which C poſſeſſes †: Therefore, the conſequence that flows from C's exerting

A ⊙
B □
C ○

* Def. 23. and Conſtruction.

† Hyp.

erting of that power, cannot be affected by the existence or non-existence of B, and consequently the existence of that effect is independent of B*. But that effect is the beginning of A's existence †, wherefore the beginning of A's existence, that is the existence of A, is independent of the being B.

* Prop. 14.

† Hyp.

Therefore, *the existence of any being, is independent of that being, which cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect*; which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXI.

THEOREM XXI.

The exiſtence of any being, is dependent on that being, which can be the cauſe of beginning its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let B be ſuch a one, as can be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, or can act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. I ſay, that in both theſe reſpects, the exiſtence of A is dependent on B. For firſt, ſince B can be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A *, B will be poſſeſſed with

A ⊙
B □

* Hypoth.

with such a power, that by the exertion of it, A will begin to exist; and consequently the beginning of A's existence will be an effect, of which the exertion of that power
† Def. 23. that B possesses is the cause †; but effects are dependent on the causes
‡ Ax. 11. that did produce them ‡. Wherefore the beginning of A's existence is dependent on B's exertion of that power it possesses; that is, the existence of the being A, is dependent on the being B.

Again, let B be such a being, which though it cannot be the cause of beginning the existence of A, yet can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy the effect. I say, that the existence of the being A, in this respect, is dependent

A ⊙
B □

dent on B. For ſince the being B can exert a power oppoſite, and equal to that power, that brings A into exiſtence *; therefore theſe two equal and contrary powers being exerted at the ſame time will mutually deſtroy each other's effect †; wherefore by the acting of theſe oppoſite powers, A cannot begin to exiſt, conſequently the beginning of A's exiſtence, is wholly dependent on the non-exertion of that power which B poſſeſſes, in oppoſition to that power that will be the cauſe of the beginning of A's exiſtence; wherefore in this reſpect the exiſtence of A is dependent on the being B.

* Hyp.

* Ax. 12.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any being, is dependent on that being, which can be the cauſe of beginning its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that*

that cause, so as to destroy its effect; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXII.

THEOREM XXII.

If the existence of any being be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the existence of A, be independent of B. I say, B cannot be the cause of beginning the existence of A, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect. For if it were possible for B either to be the cause of the beginning

ginning of A's exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect, the exiſtence of A would be dependent on B *, which is abſurd †; wherefore B can neither be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

* Prop. 21.

† Hyp.

Therefore, *if the exiſtence of any being, be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cauſe of beginning its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXIII.

THEOREM XXIII.

If the exiſtence of any being be dependent upon another being, that other being may be the cauſe of beginning its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the exiſtence of A be dependent upon B. I ſay, that B may be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. For, if B can neither be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as

A ⊙
B □

to deſtroy its effect. In both theſe reſpects, the exiſtence of A will be independent of B*, which is abſurd†: Wherefore B may either be the cauſe of the beginning of A's exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

*Prop. 20.

†Hyp.

Therefore, *if the exiſtence of any being, be dependent on another being, that other being may be the cauſe of the beginning of its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

THEOREM XXIV.

The exiſtence of any being is independent of any other being, that can neither be the cauſe of continuing its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A be any being, and B another being, which can neither be the Cauſe of continuing A in its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. I ſay, the exiſtence of A is independent of B.

A ⊙
B □

For ſince B can exert no power, that is capable of continuing A in its exiſtence,

exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that power *, * Hyp.

Therefore A may be actuated by that power on which its exiſtence depends, whether B exiſt or not. But any being may exiſt in all the points of duration, in which it is acted upon by that power on which its exiſtence depends, nothing being ſuppoſed to act in oppoſition to it, ſo as to deſtroy its effect †: Wherefore A may exiſt, † Ax. 8. without the exiſtence of B. But the exiſtence of any being is independent of that other being, without whoſe exiſtence it can exiſt §. Wherefore §Prop. 14. the exiſtence of the being A, is independent of the being B; *which was to be demonſtrated.*

Otherwiſe.

Let C D repreſent any portion of time, and E the point of duration that paſſes at the termination



of the effect of the exerted power on which the exiſtence of A depends. If that being ſhould exert that power no more, the exiſtence of A would terminate in the point of duration E; for if the exiſtence of A does not terminate in the point of duration E, then there will be an effect produced, to wit, the continuation of A's exiſtence, without a cauſe, which is abſurd *. But if the being that poſſeſſes that power ſhould again act, then will the ſame point of duration

* Ax. 2.

ration E be the firſt point of time that A will begin to be again influenced by that act; and therefore in that point of time A may be conſidered as beginning to exiſt. But B cannot act in oppoſition to that power *; and the exiſtence of any being is independent of that being which cannot be the cauſe of beginning its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect †: Wherefore the exiſtence of A is independent of B.

* Hyp.

† Prop. 20.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any being, is independent of any other being, that can neither be the cauſe of continuing its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXV.

THEOREM XXV.

The exiſtence of any being, is dependent on ſome other being, that can be the cauſe of continuing its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let B be ſuch a being that can be the cauſe of continuing A in its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. I ſay, that the exiſtence of A, in both theſe reſpects, is dependent on B. For becauſe B can exert a power that will be the cauſe of continuing A in its exiſtence*; wherefore the

* Hyp.

con-

continuing of A in its exiſtence, is an effect, of which the exertion of the power that B poſſeſſes is the cauſe *. But effects are dependent on the cauſes that did produce them †: Therefore the continuing of A's exiſtence, is dependent on the exertion of that power, which B poſſeſſes, and conſequently the exiſtence of A, in this reſpect, is dependent on the being B. Again, let B be ſuch a being, which though it cannot be the cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, yet can act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. I ſay, that the exiſtence of A is ſtill dependent on B. For ſince B can exert a power oppoſite and equal to that power that can continue A in its exiſtence ‡; therefore theſe two equal

A ⊙
B □

* Def. 23.
† Ax. 11.
‡ Hyp.

and contrary powers exerted at the same time, will destroy mutually each other's effect * ; wherefore by the exertion of these two opposite powers, A will cease to exist. Consequently the continuation of A's existence, is dependent on the non-exertion of that power, which B possesses, in opposition to that power, that can be the cause of continuing it in its existence; that is, the existence of A, in this respect, is dependent on the being B.

* Ax. 12.

Therefore, *the existence of any being, is dependent on that other being, that can be the cause of continuing its existence, or can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect*; which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXVI.

THEOREM XXVI.

If the exiſtence of any being, be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cauſe of continuing its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the exiſtence of A be independent of B. A ⊙
I ſay, that B cannot be B □
the cauſe of continuing A in its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

For, if B can be the cauſe of continuing A in its exiſtence, or act in

oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect, then will the exiſtence of A be dependent on B *, which is abſurd †.

* Prop. 25.

† Hyp.

Therefore, *if the exiſtence of any being, be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cauſe of continuing its exiſtence, nor act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect*; which was to be demonſtrated.

This and the preceding propoſition, may alſo be demonſtrated in the ſame manner with the ſecond demonſtration of the twenty fourth propoſition.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXVII.

THEOREM XXVII.

If the exiſtence of any being be dependent on another being, that other being may be the cauſe of continuing its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the exiſtence of A be dependent on B. I ſay, that B may be the cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, or may act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. For if B cannot be the cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as

to destroy its effect; then will the
Prop. 24. existence of A be independent on B;
†Hyp. which is absurd †.

Therefore, *if the existence of any being, be dependent on another being, that other being may be the cause of continuing its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect*; which was to be demonstrated.

Otherwise.

Let CD represent any portion of time, and E the point of duration that passes at the terminating of the effect, of the immediate preceding exertion of that power on which the existence of A depends. Then if the being



being that poſſeſſes that power ſhould act no more, the exiſtence of A would terminate *, and that in the point of duration E. But if it does, then will the ſame point of duration E, be the firſt point of time, that A will begin to be influenced by that act, and conſequently A may be conſidered in that point of time as beginning to exiſt. But the exiſtence of A is dependent on B †; wherefore B may either be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect ‡. But that cauſe is here demonſtrated to be the ſame cauſe that continues A in its exiſtence; conſequently B may either be the cauſe of continuing A in its exiſtence, or act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

* Prop. 18.

† Hyp.

‡ Prop. 23.

There-

Therefore, *if the exiſtence of any being*, &c. which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

THEOREM XXVIII.

The exiſtence of any being, is independent of any other being, that cannot be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings, and let B be ſuch an one, as cannot be the cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A. I ſay, the exiſtence of A is independent of B. For becauſe B cannot terminate the exiſtence of A*; therefore B cannot act in oppoſition to that cauſe, that

A ⊙
B □

* Hypoth.

that is capable of continuing the exiſtence of A, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. Wherefore the exiſtence of A is independent of B*. *Prop. 24.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any being, is independent of any other being, that cannot be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXIX.
THEOREM XXIX.

The exiſtence of any being, is dependent on that other being, that can be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings, and let B be ſuch a being that is capable of terminating the exiſtence of A. I ſay, that the exiſtence of A is dependent on B.

A ⊙
B □

For

For becauſe B is capable of terminating the exiſtence of A*; and therefore B can act in oppoſition to the cauſe that is capable of continuing A in its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effect: Conſequently the exiſtence of A is dependent on B †.

* Hyp.

† Prop. 25.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of any being, is dependent on that other being, that can be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXX.

THEOREM XXX.

Any being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of any other being, that other being cannot be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings, and let the exiſtence of A be independent of B. I ſay, that B cannot be the cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A. For becauſe the exiſtence of A is independent of B *; therefore B cannot act in oppoſition to that power, which may be the cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, ſo as to deſtroy its effect †; wherefore B cannot terminate the exiſtence of A.

A ⊙
B □

* Hyp.

† Prop. 26.

Therefore, *any being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of any other being, that other being cannot be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

THEOREM XXXI.

Any being, whoſe exiſtence depends on any other being, that other being may be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings, and let the Exiſtence of A be dependent on B. I ſay, that B may be the cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A. For becauſe the exiſtence of A is dependent

A ⊙
B □

pendent on B *; therefore B may act in oppoſition to that power which is the cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, ſo as to deſtroy its effect †. Conſequently B may be the cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A.

* Hyp.

† Prop. 27.

Therefore, *any being, whoſe exiſtence depends on any other being, that other being may be the cauſe of terminating its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

THEOREM XXXII.

A being cannot act after its exiſtence is terminated.

LET A be any being: I ſay, it is impoſſible for



the being A to act after its exiſtence is terminated. For let BC repreſent any portion of time, and D the point of duration when the exiſtence of A is terminated, and DC that part of duration that immediately ſucceeds the termination of A's exiſtence. It is impoſſible for A to act in any one point of the duration DC; for if it be poſſible, let it act in the point E. Then becauſe any being, exiſts in all the points of duration, in which it acts *,

* Ax. 4.

Therefore the being A, will exiſt in the point of duration E, but its exiſtence terminated in the point of duration D†; therefore A will both exiſt and not exiſt in the ſame point of duration E, which is abſurd ‡.

† Hyp.

‡ Ax. 6.

Therefore, *a being cannot act after its exiſtence is terminated*; which was to be demonſtrated. PRO-

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

THEOREM XXXIII.

An action of any being cannot be compleated in one point of duration only.

BEcauſe, however ſmall a time, an action of any being may be conceived to be compleated in, it will have a beginning and ending, and therefore one point of duration at leaſt will exiſt between theſe two extreams: Wherefore the ſmalleſt part of duration, that an action of any being can be compleated in, will at leaſt conſiſt of three points of duration.

Therefore, *an action of any being cannot be compleated in one point of duration only*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

THEOREM XXXIV.

A being cannot act in the point of duration in which its exiſtence is terminated, in oppoſition to that power that continues it in its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effect.

LET A be any being, and BC a portion of time, D that point of it in which the exiſtence of A is terminated. I ſay, it is impoſſible for A to act in the point of duration D, in oppoſition to that power, which continues its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effect. For, if it be poſſible for A to act in the point



point of duration D, in oppoſition to that power which continues A in its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effect, then will the termination of A's exiſtence be an effect of which the acting of A in the point of duration D is the cauſe *. And becauſe the exiſtence of A is terminated in the point D †; therefore A cannot act after the point of duration D ‡: But that action is begun in the ſame point D §; wherefore that action of A will be compleated in the point of duration D only, which is abſurd ‖.

* Def. 23.
† Hyp.
‡ Prop. 32.
§ Hyp.
‖ Prop 33.

Therefore, *a being cannot act in the point of duration, in which its exiſtence is terminated, in oppoſition to that power which continues its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effects*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

THEOREM XXXV.

Every being will be actuated by a power, in oppoſition to that power which continues its exiſtence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its exiſtence is terminated.

LET A be any being, and BC any portion of time, and let D be the point of duration that terminates its exiſtence, and E, G, H, *&c.* theſe points of duration immediately antecedent to D. I ſay, that A will be



be actuated by a power in oppoſition to that power that continues it in its exiſtence in the points of duration H, G, E and D. For if A be not actuated in the points of duration H, G, E and D, in oppoſition to that power that continues it in its exiſtence, and the exiſtence of any being, is dependent on that being that continues it in its exiſtence *. But A not being actuated in the points of duration H, G, E and D, in oppoſition to that power on which its exiſtence depends †; therefore A may be actuated in the points of duration H, G, E and D, by that power on which its exiſtence depends, without any being acting in oppoſition to it, ſo as to deſtroy its effect; wherefore the exiſtence of A will be continued in the points of duration H, G, E and D‡,

* Prop. 25.

† Hyp.

‡ Ax. 8.

and

and cannot terminate in any of them,
*Hyp. but it terminates in D *: which is abſurd. Therefore the being A will be actuated in the point of duration D, by a power, in oppoſition to that power which continues it in its exiſtence. It will alſo be actuated by the ſame power in the points H, G, E, which are the immediate antecedent points to the laſt point of duration that terminates its exiſtence; for if not, then will that action, which terminates the exiſtence of A, be compleated in the point of duration B, D
†Prop. 33. which is abſurd †. Wherefore the being A will be actuated in the points of duration H, G, E, by a power, in oppoſition to that power which continues it in its exiſtence.

Therefore, *every being will be actuated by a power, in oppoſition to*

that power, which continues its exiſtence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its exiſtence is terminated; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

THEOREM XXXVI.

That being, which is the ultimate cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any other being, will act in oppoſition to the cauſe that continues its exiſtence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its exiſtence is terminated.

LET

LET A and B be two beings, CD any portion of time, and let B be the



cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A, and E the point of duration in which its exiſtence is terminated, and F, G, H, &c. the immediate antecedent points of duration to E. I ſay, that B will act in the points of duration F, G, H, &c. in oppoſition to the cauſe that continues A in its exiſtence. For becauſe the exiſtence of A terminates in the point of duration E * ; therefore A will be actuated by a power, in oppoſition to that power that continues it in its exiſtence in the points of duration H, G, F and E †. But that actuating of A, is the preſſing on or influencing

* Hyp.

† Prop. 35.

of

of it, by the power which B poſſeſſes, and that preſſing on or influencing of A, is the acting of the being B ‡. Wherefore the being B acts in the points of duration H, G, F and E, which are the immediate antecedent points to, and the laſt point of duration that terminates the exiſtence of A.

‡ Def. 37.

Therefore, *that being, which is the ultimate cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any other being, will act in oppoſition to the cauſe that continues its exiſtence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its exiſtence is terminated*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

THEOREM XXXVII.

A being cannot be the ultimate cauſe, which terminates its own exiſtence.

FOR, if any being can be the ultimate cauſe of terminating its own exiſtence, it will act in the immediate antecedent points to, and the laſt point of duration that terminates its exiſtence, in oppoſition to that power that continues it in its exiſtence *; and conſequently will act in the point of duration that terminates its exiſtence, in oppoſition to that power that continues it in its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effect, which is abſurd †.

*Prop. 36.

†Prop. 34.

There-

Therefore, *a being cannot be the ultimate cauſe, which terminates its own exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

THEOREM XXXVIII.

That being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned, is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned. I ſay, that A is a dependent being. For, becauſe a time can be aſſigned antecedent to A's exiſtence*; therefore A is a temporary being†. But the exiſtence of any temporary being, is dependent on ſome

A ⊙
B □

* Hyp.
† Def. 21.

ſome other being exiſting antecedent
‡Prop.4. to it ‡, which let be B. Then be-
cauſe the exiſtence of A depends on
†Hyp. the being B †, but effects are depen-
dent upon the cauſes that did produce
*Ax. 11. them *; therefore the exiſtence of
A is an effect, of which the being B
is the cauſe; but that being, whoſe
exiſtence is the effect of ſome other
§Def. 27. being, is a dependent being §; there-
fore A is a dependent being.

Therefore, *that being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

THEOREM XXXIX.

That being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, or which from all eternity exiſted, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

LET A repreſent a being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, or which from all eternity exiſted. I ſay, that A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For, if A is not a ſelf-exiſting being, the exiſtence of A is dependent on ſome other being *, which if poſſible let be B; then becauſe the exiſtence of A is dependent on

A ⊙
B □

*Prop. 16.

B, therefore B may be the cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of

*Prop. 23. A *; therefore it is poſ- A ⊙
ſible for the exiſtence of B □
A to have had a beginning, and conſequently a time may be aſſigned antecedent to the exi-

† Hyp. ſtence of A, which is abſurd †. Wherefore the exiſtence of A cannot be dependent on any other being: But a being, whoſe exiſtence is not dependent on any other being, is a

‡ Def. 26. ſelf-exiſting and independent being ‡; conſequently A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

Therefore, *that being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, or which from all eternity exiſted, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XL.

THEOREM XL.

A dependent being cannot have exiſted from all eternity.

LET A be a dependent being. I ſay, that A cannot have exiſted from all eternity.

A ⊙

For, if it be poſſible for A to have exiſted from all eternity, then no time can be aſſigned antecedent to A's exiſtence * ; but that being, antecedent to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being † : Wherefore A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, which is abſurd ‡. Conſequently A cannot have exiſted from all eternity.

* Cor. to Prop. 9.

† Prop. 39.

‡ Hyp.

Therefore, *a dependent being cannot have existed from all eternity*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XLI.

THEOREM XLI.

A self-existing and independent being existed from all eternity.

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being. A ⊙

I say, that A from all eternity existed. For if A has not existed from all eternity, a time may be assigned antecedent to its existence; but any being antecedent to whose existence a time can be assigned, is a dependent being *; wherefore A is a dependent being, which

*Prop. 38.

is

is abſurd *. Therefore no time can be aſſigned antecedent to A's exiſtence, conſequently A exiſted from all eternity. * Hyp.

Therefore, *a ſelf-exiſting and independent being exiſted from all eternity*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XLII.

THEOREM XLII.

That being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned, is a dependent being.

LET A be a being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned. I ſay, A ⊙ A is a dependent being.

For ſince a time can be aſſigned, poſterior

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*Hyp. sterior to A's existence *, the existence of A will terminate antecedent to that time; but no being can be the ultimate cause of terminating its own †Prop. 37. existence †; therefore the existence of A will be terminated by some other being. But the existence of any being, is dependent on that being, which can be the cause of terminating its existence ‖; wherefore the existence of A will be dependent on that other being. But effects are dependent upon the causes that did produce them ‡; wherefore the existence of A is the effect of that other being on which its existence depends is the cause, consequently the existence of A is the effect of that other being. But that being, whose existence is the effect of some other being, is a dependent being §: Consequently A is a dependent being. There-

‖ Prop. 28.

‡ Ax. 11.

as

§ Def. 27.

Therefore, *that being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

THEOREM XLIII.

That being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, or which to all eternity will exiſt, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

LET A repreſent a being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, or which to all eternity will exiſt. I ſay, A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For if A is not a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, its exiſtence

A ⊙
B □

will be dependent on ſome other be-
§ Prop. 16. ing §, which if poſſible let be B. Then becauſe the exiſtence of A is dependent on B; therefore B may be the cauſe of terminating the exiſtence
*Prop. 31. of A *; and conſequently it is poſ-
ſible to aſſign a time poſterior to the
† Hyp. exiſtence of A, which is abſurd †: Wherefore the exiſtence of A cannot be dependent on any other being. But a being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of any other being, is a ſelf-
‡ Def. 26. exiſting and independent being ‡; conſequently A is a ſelf exiſting and independent being.

Therefore, *that being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence no time can be aſſigned, or which to all eternity will exiſt, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XLIV.
THEOREM XLIV.

The exiſtence of every dependent being may be terminated.

LET A be a dependent being: I ſay, that the exiſtence of A may be terminated.

A ⊙

For becauſe A is a dependent being *, therefore its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being †, and the exiſtence of A will be dependent upon that other being; but that being, on which the exiſtence of any other being depends, can act in oppoſition to the power that continues its exiſtence §, ſo as to deſtroy its effect; wherefore that other being, on which the exiſtence of A depends, can act in oppoſition to that power that

* Hyp.

† Def. 27.

§ Def. 27.

that continues A in its exiſtence, ſo as to deſtroy its effect; and conſequently, by the exertion of that power, the exiſtence of A may be terminated.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of every dependent being may be terminated*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XLV.

THEOREM XLV.

The exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, cannot at any time be terminated, or will to all eternity continue to exiſt.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting and independent being. A ⊙

I ſay, that the exiſtence

of

of A cannot at any time be terminated, or A will to all eternity continue to exiſt. For, if it be poſſible for A not to exiſt to all eternity, then may a time be aſſigned poſterior to its exiſtence: But that being, poſterior to whoſe exiſtence a time can be aſſigned, is a dependent being *; wherefore A is a dependent being, which is abſurd †. Conſequently the exiſtence of A cannot at any time be terminated, or A will to all eternity continue to exiſt.

* Prop. 42.

† Hyp.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, cannot at any time be terminated, or it will to all eternity continue to exiſt*; which was to be demonſtrated.

From theſe laſt eight propoſitions, it is clearly demonſtrated:

Firſt,

Firſt, That a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, from all eternity did exiſt, and to all eternity will exiſt.

Second, That a being which from all eternity did exiſt, and to all eternity will exiſt, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

Third, That a being which did begin to exiſt, and whoſe exiſtence may be terminated, is a dependent being.

Fourth, That a dependent being cannot from all eternity have exiſted, and may not to all eternity exiſt.

In this laſt caſe it may be obſerved, that it is neither demonſtrated, nor is it intended by the propoſitions, to prove that the exiſtence of a dependent being, muſt or will be terminated, but only that it is poſſible for its exiſtence to be terminated.

The End of the Firſt Book.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Geometrically Demonſtrated.

BOOK II.

DEFINITIONS.

I. REaſoning, *is comparing the agreement or diſagreement of ideas.*

II. Judging, *is the determination of the agreement or diſagreement of*

compared ideas; or the effect of comparing them.

III. Willing or volition, *is the determination to act or not to act.*

IV. A self-determining power *of any being, is the power of acting according to its own will, without the immediate act of any other being.*

V. Similar powers or qualities, *are those which are of the same kind, or operate in the same manner; such as thinking, judging, willing,* &c. *thus two beings, endued with thinking, judging, willing,* &c. *are so far said to be possessed of similar powers or qualities, as they both think, judge or will, and so of other powers. But it is not to be understood, that beings having*

having ſimilar powers, are therefore poſſeſſed of equal powers, or of thoſe powers in the ſame degree; neither is it neceſſary, that all the powers each being poſſeſſes ſhould be ſimilar, but only each to each, as thought to thought, judgment to judgment, or volition to volition, &c.

VI. Similar and conſpiring powers or qualities, *are thoſe which exerted in the ſame time, produce a greater effect than could be produced by the exertion of any one of them; or whoſe conjunct operation increaſes the effect, which any one of them in the ſame time could produce.*

VII. Equal ſimilar and conſpiring powers or qualities, *are thoſe which exerted*

exerted at different but equal times, produce the ſame effect.

VIII. Contrary and ſimilar powers or qualities, *are thoſe which operating againſt each other, decreaſe the effect which one of them could have produced if that alone had been exerted, or thoſe which produce a leſs effect than might have been produced by the exertion of the greateſt contrary power or quality.*

AXIOMS.

I. *ANY being, that ever did, or can exiſt, was, or will be poſſeſſed of ſome powers or qualities.*

II. *The exiſtence of any being is terminated, in the ſame point of duration in which the exiſtence of all the powers or qualities, which it does poſſeſs, do terminate. That is, if the life of any animal be wholly conſtituted, from the motion of the blood, and ſecretion of other juices; then will the life of that animal terminate in the ſame point of duration, that the motion and ſecretion of the blood, and other juices do terminate. Or if matter be ſuppoſed to be only poſſeſſed of*

solidity, then will the existence of matter terminate in the same point of duration, in which the existence of solidity is terminated.

LEMMA I.

NO material being can change its magnitude, figure, place, or situation, with respect to other bodies, or the position and situation of the particles that compose it, with respect to one another, without being compelled so to do, by the impression of some external force.

Let A be any material being, either lying on any smooth surface, or sus-



pended

pended in the form of a pendulum; it is evident that it will remain at reſt, in all the points of duration, that no cauſe intervenes to make it change that ſtate.

And if any other body as B, be in motion, and impinge upon A, then will part of the force that B moved with before the ſtroke, be communicated to A in the point of duration in which the colliſion was made, and B after the ſtroke does not move with the ſame velocity that it did move with before the ſtroke. This is evident from all experiments made on material beings.

LEMMA II.

MAtter, or every material being, poſſeſſes an inactive quality, by which equally in all directions it reſiſts every alteration or change of its ſtate, with a force proportionable to the quantity of matter that compoſes that being.

Let A be any body at reſt on the plane BC, and D any other body in motion impinging on A, by this colliſion the body D will* loſe part of the force it moved with before the ſtroke. That loſs of the force that D ſuffers by the ſtroke, could not have happened, if A had



* Lemma 1.

not been poſſeſſed with an inactive or reſiſting power, by which it deſtroys part of the force of D's motion. Becauſe, if there had been no inactivity in the body A, then may the motion of D before the ſtroke be conſidered as an exiſting being; and therefore in the point of duration that the ſtroke was made, the being D will be actuated by that power that continues it in its motion, nothing acting in oppoſition to it, ſo as to deſtroy either the whole or part of the effect: Therefore the exiſtence of the being, that is, the whole motion, will be continued *. And conſequently D will move with the ſame degree of velocity after, that it did move with before the ſtroke, in the ſame direction, and muſt have

* Ax. 8. L. 1.

carried A along with it, however it may differ in magnitude and denſity from D; which is contrary to all experiments that are made on material beings.



Again, let B be a very ſmall material being, and A an infinitely great one, and let C be the force that is neceſſary, to move B with the Velocity D, then will the motion of B be an effect produced, of which the impreſſed force C is the cauſe; and ſince B and C are both finite *, the force that the being B moves with, is alſo finite. If the being A be ſuppoſed to move with the ſame velocity D, then becauſe A is † infi-

* Hypoth.

† Hyp.

nitely great, the force that A moves with will alſo be infinitely great, that is, the effect produced by A's motion, will be an infinitely great effect. But effects produced, are in proportion to the cauſes that did produce them*. Wherefore the force that is neceſſary to move A with the velocity D, will be infinitely great; but ſince A cannot reſiſt the force of the being B, impinging upon it, that effect will be produced by the finite force with which B moves; that is, a finite force will produce an infinite effect, which is abſurd †. Therefore the being A, and every material being, poſſeſſes a power of inactivity, by which it reſiſts the force of any other being impinging upon it; and that reſiſting force is proportionable to the quantity of matter that com-

* Ax. 4. L. 1.

† Ax. 4. L. 1.

poſes the body. And ſince no change can be made on material beings but by motion, and motion is oppoſed by its reſiſting power; therefore, every material being, reſiſts equally in all directions any alteration or change of ſtate whatever that can be made on it, with a force proportionable to the quantity of matter that compoſes the body.

Corollary 1. From hence it follows, that, if any body as A, in the time B, move thro' the ſpace C, by the force D, it will * require double the force D, to cauſe the body A to move through double the ſpace C;



* Ax. 4. L. 1.

in

in the ſame time B, and three times the force D, to cauſe the body A move through three times the ſpace C, in the time B; and ſo on of all other multiples and ſubmultiples.

Corollary 2. From this it alſo follows, that matter acts by the preſſure or influence of ſome other being.

PRO-

PROPOSITION I.

THEOREM I.

Two, or any number of beings, possessed with equal powers; the effects produced by the exertion of those powers, in different times, are in proportion to each other, as the times in which these powers were exerted.

LET A and B be two beings that are possessed with equal powers,

A ⊙ C D
B □ E F

and let C and E represent two different portions of time, and let A by the

the exertion of the power it poſſeſſes, produce the effect D in the time C; and B, by the exertion of the power it poſſeſſes, produce the effect F in the time E; I ſay, that the effect D is to the effect F, as the time C is to the time E. For becauſe the powers that the beings A and B poſſeſs are equal *, and effects produced are in proportion to the cauſes that did produce them †; therefore in equal times the exertion of the powers will be equal, and conſequently the effects produced by the exertion of the powers that A and B poſſeſſes, will be equal; wherefore if the time C be equal to the time E, the effect D will be equal to the effect F.

* Hyp.

† Ax. 2. L. 1.

If the time C be double of the time E, then is the time C diviſible into two parts, which let be GH and HK,

HK, each equal to the time E. Then becauſe the time GH is equal to the time HK, the effect produced from the exertion of A's power, in the time GH, will be equal to that produced by the exertion of the ſame power in the time HK; and ſince theſe two effects are equal, their ſum will be double one of them, and conſequently the effect D, which is produced in the time GK, is double the effect produced in the time GH. But becauſe the time GH is equal to the time E, the effect produced in the time GH, by the exertion of A's power, is equal to the effect F, that is produced by the exertion of B's power; wherefore the effect D, that is



pro-

produced by the exertion of A's power in the time C, is double the effect F, that is produced by the exertion of B's power in the time E. Again, if the time C be three times the time E, then will C be diviſible into three parts, each equal to E, and conſequently the effect D will be thrice the effect F. For the ſame reaſon, if the time C be quadruple the time E, the effect D will be quadruple of the effect F; and ſo on, univerſally of all multiples. Alſo, if the time C be half of the time E, then will the time E be diviſible into two parts, each equal to the time C, and in the ſame manner, as before, the effect D will be half the effect F, and if the time C be a third part of the time E, the effect D will be a third part of the effect F; and ſo univerſally of all the

* Def. of 4 Proportions.

the submultiples. Therefore *, whatever proportion the time C bears to the time E, the same proportion will the effect D bear to the effect F. Therefore, *two, or any number of beings, possessed with equal powers, the effects produced by the exertion of these powers in different times, are in proportion to each other, as the times in which these powers were exerted*; which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. From this Proposition it plainly follows, that if effects produced by the exertion of certain powers, in different times, be in proportion to one another, as the times in which they were produced, the powers, by whose exertion they were produced, are equal to one another.

PRO-

PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM II.

Two, or any number of beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them, are in proportion to each other as the powers themſelves.

LET A and B be any two beings that are poſſeſſed with different powers, and let C repreſent any portion of time, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of the power that A poſſeſſes in the time C, and E the effect that is produced from the exertion



exertion of the power that B poſſeſſes in the ſame time C: I ſay, that the effect D is to the effect E, as the power in the being A is to the power in the being B. For becauſe D and E are the effects produced by the exertion of the powers in the beings A and B in the time C; if the powers were equal, then would the effect D be equal to the effect E *. And if the power in the being A be double the power in B, then will the power in A be diviſible into two parts, each of which will be equal to the power in the being B; and the exertion of theſe two equal powers in A in the ſame time C, will produce equal effects, and each equal to the effect E that is produced by the exertion of the power in B, in the ſame time C †; and theſe two equal effects

* Prop. 1. of this.

† Prop. 1. of this.

effects produced from the exertion of A's power, added together, will be double the effect E; wherefore if the power in A be double the power in the being B, the effect D will be double the effect E; for the ſame reaſon, if the power in A be triple the power in B, the effect D will be triple the Effect E, and ſo univerſally of all multiples. Alſo, if the power in A be half the power in B, the effect D will in the ſame manner be proved * to be half of the effect E, and ſo univerſally of all other ſub-multiples. Therefore †, as the effect D is to the effect E, ſo is the power that A poſſeſſes, to the power that B poſſeſſes. Wherefore, *two, or any number of beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them in the ſame time, are*

* Prop. 1. of this.

† Def. 1. of four Proportionals.

to each other, as the powers themſelves; which was to be demonſtrated.

This propoſition may otherwiſe be demonſtrated.

For becauſe D is the effect produced by the exertion of the power
Hyp. that the being A poſſeſſes, the power that A poſſeſſes is the cauſe of the effect D; for the ſame reaſon E is an effect produced, of which the power that the being B poſſeſſes, is the cauſe, and both beings produced in the ſame time C; but effects produced, are in proportion to the cauſes that did produce
† Ax. 2. L. 1. them†; wherefore the effect D is to the effect E, as the power that A poſſeſſes is to the power that the being B poſ-

poſſeſſes. Therefore, *two, or any number of beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, &c.* which was to be demonſtrated.

Corollary. From this propoſition it follows, that if effects produced, be in proportion to the powers, which the beings producing them did poſſeſs, the times in which theſe effects were produced, are equal.

In the doctrine of proportion, I have demonſtrated, that if there be three magnitudes taken in any order, the ratio which the firſt bears to the third, is compounded of the ratios of the firſt to the ſecond, and the ſecond to the third. And univerſally, if there be any number of magnitudes,

taken in any order, the ratio that the firſt bears to the laſt, is compounded of all the preceding ratios. This property of the ratios of the magnitudes is cited by Euclid, in his demonſtration of the twenty third propoſition of his ſixth book. Aſſumed by him from the tenth definition of his fifth book, and his definition of a ratio, compounded of ratios, which is his fifth definition of his ſixth book, without a demonſtration; and as this is one of the moſt uſeful properties of proportionals, and capable of a demonſtration, it ought on that account not to be taken for granted. The demonſtration that I have there given, is univerſal, and includes the properties of all beings in nature; which I ſhall ſtate in the following lemma, in order to facilitate the demon-

monſtration of the following propoſition. I retain the definition of a ratio compounded of ratios; which Euclid gives in the fifth of his ſixth Book.

LEMMA III.

IN comparing the powers of three beings, taken in any order, the power of the firſt is to the power of the third, in a ratio compounded of the firſt power to the ſecond, and the ſecond to the third.

Let A, B, and C be three beings, and let DE repreſent the power that A poſſeſſes, F the power that B poſſeſſes, and G the

power that C possesses: I say, that DE is to G in a ratio compounded of DE to F, and of F to G. For let DE, which is the power that A possesses, be thrice the power that B possesses, to wit F, and B's power be six times C's power, *viz.* G. Now because DE is thrice F, DE is divisible into three parts, each equal to F, which let be DH, HK, and KE; also because F is six times G, and DH is equal to F*, therefore DH will be six times G, for the same reason HK, KE, are each six times G; wherefore the whole DE contains G eighteen times, and consequently the Ratio of DE to G is eighteen †. But the ratio of DE to F is three, and the ratio of F to G is six ‡; therefore the ratio that is compounded of DE to F, and of F to G, is

* Constr.

† Def. of Ratios.

‡ Hyp.

is eighteen *: But before it was demonſtrated, that the ratio of DE to G is eighteen, conſequently the ratio of DE to G is compounded of the ratios of DE to F, and of F to G; but DE, F, and G, repreſent the powers which the beings A, B, and C poſſeſs reſpectively. Therefore, the power that the being A poſſeſſes, is to the power that B poſſeſſes, in a ratio compounded of the ratios of A's power to B's power, and of B's power to C's power.

* Def. of a Ratio compounded of Ratios.

Again, let A, B, and C be any three beings, and let the power that A poſſeſſes be thrice the power that B poſſeſſes; but the power that B poſſeſſes be one ſixth part of the power that C poſſeſſes. Now becauſe A's power is thrice B's power, the

A ⊙
B □
C ○

ratio of A's power to B's power is three *; and for the same reason the Ratio of B's power to C's power is one sixth, and consequently, the ratio that is equal to that, which is compounded of the ratios of A's power to B's power, and B's power to C's power †, is three sixths, or one third. But because A's power contains B's power thrice ‡, therefore A's power is divisible into three parts, each of which is equal to B's power; but B's power is one sixth of C's power, therefore each of these parts of A's power, equal to B's power, will be one sixth of C's power, and consequently A's power will be three sixths of C's power; therefore § the ratio of A's power to C's power, is three sixths, or one third: But it has been demonstrated, that the ratio equal

* Def. of Ratios.

† Def. of the Ratio compounded of Ratios.

‡ Hyp.

§ Def. of Ratios.

equal to that, which is compounded of the ratios of A's power to B's power, and of B's power to C's power, is one third. Wherefore the power that A poſſeſſes, is to the power that C poſſeſſes, in a ratio compounded of A's power to B's power, and B's power to C's power.

Laſtly, if there be four, or any number of beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, and taken in any order, the ratio of the firſt power to the laſt is compounded of the ratios of all the preceding powers.

For let A, B, C, D, be four beings, taken in any order, and poſſeſſed of different powers. I ſay, the ratio of the power in the being A, is to that in the being D, in a ratio compounded of

A ⊙
B □
C ▫
D ○

the ratio of the power in A, to that in the being B, and of the power in B, to that in the being C, and of the power in C, to that in the being D. For, because there are three beings, A, B, and C, possessed with different powers, the power in the being A is to the power in the being C, in a ratio compounded of the ratio of the power in A, to the power in B, and of the ratio of the power in B, to that in C*. Again, because there are three beings, B, C, and D, possessed of different powers, the power in B will be to that in D, in a ratio compounded of the power in B to that in C, and of the power in C to that in D. But before it was proved, that the power in A to that in C, was compounded of the ratios of the power in A to that in B, and of

* Above Demonstration.

of the power in B to that in C. Take that compound ratio, in the place of the ratio of the power in A to that in C, then will the ratio of the power in A to that in D, be compounded of the ratios of the power in A to that in B, of the power in B to that in C, and of the power in C to that in D.

After the ſame manner it may be demonſtrated, that if there were five, ſix, or any number of beings, poſſeſſed of different powers, the ratio of the power of the firſt being, to that of the laſt, is compounded of the ratios of the powers of all the preceding beings.

Whatever property or proportion is demonſtrated, of the powers that different beings poſſeſs, the ſame properties or proportions will alſo take

place,

place, with respect to the effects that are produced from the exertion of those powers. Because the exertion of those powers are the causes of the effects, and effects have the same proportion to one another as their causes have *. Wherefore, &c.

* Ax. 2. L. 1.

PROPOSITION III.

THEOREM III.

Two, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them in different times, will be in a ratio to one another compounded, of the power to the power that did produce them, and of the time to the time in which they were produced.

LET



LET A and B be two beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of the power poſſeſſed by A in the time C, and F the effect that is produced by the exertion of the power that B poſſeſſes in the time E. I ſay, the effect D is to the effect F, in a ratio compounded of the time C to the time E, and of the power that A poſſeſſes to the power that B poſſeſſes. For let G be a third being, poſſeſſed with a power equal to A's, and let H be the effect that is produced from the exertion of G's power in the time E. Then becauſe the two beings A and G

are

are poſſeſſed with equal powers, the effect D will be to the effect H, as
Prop. 1. of this. the time C is to the time E, in which they were produced. Again, becauſe H and F are two effects produced, by the exertion of the powers that the beings G and B poſſeſs in the ſame time F; therefore the effect H is to the effect F, as the power that G poſſeſſes is to the power that B poſ-
† Prop. 2. of this. ſeſſes †. And becauſe there are three effects, D, H, and F, therefore the ratio of the firſt D to the third F, is compounded of the ratio of the firſt D to the ſecond H, and of the ſecond
§ L. 3. H to the third F §. But it has been demonſtrated, that D is to H, as the time C is to the time E, and as H is to F, ſo is the power in G, that is the power in A, to the power in B; wherefore, the effect D is to the ef-

fect

fect F, in a ratio compounded of the time C to the time E, and of the power that A poſſeſſes to the power that the being B poſſeſſes. Therefore, *two, or any number of beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them in different times, are to each other in a ratio compounded, of the power to the power, and of the time to the time, in which they were produced*; which was to be demonſtrated.

Corollary. From this propoſition it follows, that if the powers that two or more beings poſſeſs, be repreſented by lines, which we ſhall ſuppoſe form one ſide of two or more rectangles, and the times in which theſe powers were exerted,

be alſo expreſſed by lines which form the adjacent ſides of the ſame rectangles. Then becauſe the ſuperficies of rectangles are demonſtrated by Euclid, in the twenty third propoſition of his ſixth book, to be to one another in a ratio compounded directly of the ſides; and in this propoſition the effects produced by the exertion of the powers in different beings, in different times, are proved to be to one another in a Ratio compounded directly of the powers and times in which they were produced; and theſe powers and times being here repreſented as the ſides about the right angle in the rectangles, therefore the ratio that the effects bear to one another, will be the ſame, with the ſuperficies of theſe rectangles,

angles, and the one may be expreſſed for the other; and therefore all the proportions that Euclid demonſtrates, concerning the ſides about the right angle and ſuperficies of rectangles in his ſixth book, will here take place with reſpect to the effects, to the powers that did produce them, and to the times in which they were produced. And therefore as he proves, in his fourteenth propoſition of that book, that if the ſuperficies of the rectangles are equal, the ſides about the right angle are in reciprocal proportion; ſo here concerning powers of beings, the times of their operation, and the effects produced; if the effects produced are equal, then will the powers that did produce them, and

the times in which they were produced, be in reciprocal proportion. And if the powers of beings, and the times in which they operate, be in reciprocal proportion, the effects themſelves will be equal. And therefore rectangles and their ſides may be ſafely taken to expreſs the effects, the power of beings, and the times of their operations; for ſince they have the ſame proportion to one another that theſe have, the one may be ſubſtituted for the other.

PRO-

PROPOSITION IV.

THEOREM IV.

Two beings poſſeſſed with different powers, and by the exertion of them producing different effects in different times. The power that the one being poſſeſſes is to the power the other poſſeſſes, in a ratio compounded, directly of the effects produced, and reciprocally of the times, in which theſe effects were produced.

LET A and B be two beings, poſſeſſed with different powers, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of A's power in the time C, and F the effect that is produced from the exertion

of B's power in the time E. I ſay, the power that A poſſeſſes, is to the power that B poſſeſſes, in a ratio compounded of the effect D to the effect F, and of the time E to the time C. For let G be a third being, taken ſo, that D may be the effect produced from the exertion of the power it poſſeſſes in the time E. Then becauſe the two beings A and G, produce the ſame effect D, in the times C and E; therefore *, the power that A poſſeſſes, is to the power that G poſſeſſes, as the time E is to the time C. Again, becauſe the two beings G and B, produce the effects D and



* Cor. Prop. 3. of this.

and F in the ſame time E; therefore*, the effect D is to the effect F, as the power that G poſſeſſes is to the power that B poſſeſſes. Again, becauſe there are three beings, A, G, and B, therefore † the power of A, is to the power of B, in a ratio compounded of A's power to G's power, and of G's power to B's power; but before it was demonſtrated, that A's power is to G's power, as the time E is to the time C; and alſo, that G's power is to B's power, as the effect D is to the effect F; wherefore A's power is to B's power, in a ratio compounded of the effect D to the effect F, and of the time E to the time C.

* Prop. 2. of this.

† Lemma 3. preceding Prop. 3. of this.

Therefore, *two beings poſſeſſed with different powers, and by the exertion of them producing different effects, in different times; the power that the*

one being possesses, is to the power that the other possesses, in a ratio compounded directly of the effects produced, and reciprocally of the times in which they were produced; which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. From this proposition it is evident, that if two different beings produce different effects in different times, the ratio of the time to the time, is compounded directly of the effects produced, and reciprocally of the powers that did produce them.

PRO-

PROPOSITION V.

PROBLEM I.

Two beings, poſſeſſed with powers of the ſame kind: One of which by the exertion of the power it poſſeſſes in a given time, produces a given effect; it is required to find the time, the other will take to produce an effect equal to the effect given.

LET A and B be two beings, poſſeſſed with powers of the ſame kind, and let A, by the exertion of its power in the time C, produce the effect D; it is



required to find the time that B will produce an effect equal to D, by the exertion of the power it poſſeſſes. Let the power that A poſſeſſes be expreſſed by F, and the power that B poſſeſſes be expreſſed by G; and let E be a fourth proportional found to the three given Terms G, F, and C, then E will expreſs the time required.

* Conſtruction.

For becauſe G is to F, as C is to E *, and G is the power that B poſſeſſes, F the power that A poſſeſſes, and C the time that A exerts its power to produce the effect D; therefore, as B's power is to A's power, ſo is the time that A exerts its power to the time E, conſequently the powers and times are in reciprocal proportion; but when the powers of beings, and the times in which they exert them, are in reciprocal proportion, the effects

fects produced by theſe beings are equal *; wherefore E will be the time the given being B will take in exerting the power it poſſeſſes, to produce an effect equal to the given effect D, which was to be done.

* Cor. Prop. 3. of this.

PROPOSITION VI.

THEOREM V.

Two unequal, but contrary cauſes or powers, preſſing upon, or influencing one and the ſame being in the ſame time, that part of the effect that would have been produced by the exertion of the greater power alone, and which is deſtroyed by the conjunct exertion of both powers, is in proportion to the ſmaller power.

LET

LET A and B be two unequal, but contrary powers, whereof A is the greater, and C any portion of time, and let DE be the effect that would be produced by the exertion of the power that A poſſeſſes, when exerted alone in the time C, and F the effect that would be produced in the ſame time by the exertion of B's power alone. Then becauſe DE and F are the effects that are produced by the exertion of the unequal powers that A and B poſſeſs in the ſame time C; therefore the effect DE is to the effect F, as the power that A poſſeſſes is to the power that B poſſeſſes*; but A's power is greater than B's power†, therefore DE is



* Prop. 2. of this.
† Hyp.

greater

greater than F *. Let DG be made equal to F, then will DG be the effect that would be produced, from the exertion of that part of the power that A poſſeſſes, equal to B's power in the ſame time C†, A's power being in this caſe ſtill ſuppoſed to act alone. Therefore by the conjunct acting of the beings A and B in the ſame time C, the effects DG and F will be deſtroyed ‡. Now ſince the effect DG that is deſtroyed, is equal to F, and F is in proportion to the power that B poſſeſſes; conſequently that part of the effect produced by the exertion of A's power, when acting alone, is in proportion to the power that B poſſeſſes. Therefore, *two unequal, but contrary cauſes or powers, preſſing upon, or influencing the ſame being in the ſame time; that part of the*

* Prop. 14. E. L. 5.

† Prop. 1. of this.

‡ Ax. 12. Lib. 1.

* Which is deſtroyed by the conjunct acting of B.

the effect that would have been produced by the exertion of the greater power alone, and which is destroyed by the conjunct acting of both powers, is in proportion to the smaller power; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION VII.

THEOREM VI.

Two unequal similar, but contrary powers or causes, pressing upon, or influencing one and the same being in the same time; the effect that would have been produced by the exertion of the greater power alone, is to that part of the effect that is destroyed by the conjunct exertion of both powers, as the greater power is to the smaller.

LET

LET A and B be two beings, poſſeſſed with unequal ſimilar,



but contrary powers or cauſes, whereof A is the greater, C any portion of time, and DE the effect that would be produced by the exertion of A's power alone in the time C and F, that which would be produced from the exertion of B's power alone in the ſame time C. Then will the effect DE be to the effect F, as the power that A poſſeſſes, is to the power that B poſſeſſes *; but A's power is greater than B's power, therefore the effect DE is greater than the effect F. Let DG be equal to F, then will DG be that part of the effect DE that will be deſtroyed

* Prop. 2. of this.

when both press or influence one and the same being in the same time *. But as A's power is to B's power, so is the effect DE produced from the exertion of the greatest power, *viz.* A's power alone, to DG, which is equal to [redacted] F. Therefore, *if two beings, possessed with unequal similar, but contrary powers, press upon, or influence one and the same being in the same time; the effect that would be produced by the exertion of the greater power when acting alone, is to that part of the effect that would be destroyed by the conjunct acting of both powers, as the greater power is to the smaller*; which was to be demonstrated.

* Prop. 6. of this.

Cor. 1. From this and the preceding proposition it follows, that the effect

effect which is produced from the conjunct acting of two ſimilar unequal, but contrary powers, is equal to the exceſs by which the greater exceeds the ſmaller, or equal to the effect which a ſimilar power, equal to that exceſs, would produce when acting alone.

Coroll. 2. The effect that would be produced from the conjunct acting of two ſimilar unequal, but contrary powers, preſſing upon, or influencing the ſame being, will, upon the ſmaller power ceaſing to act, be augmented in proportion to the ſmaller power.

PRO-

PROPOSITION VIII.

THEOREM VII.

The effect that is produced from the conjunct acting of two unequal ſimilar conſpiring powers, preſſing upon, or influencing the ſame being in the ſame time, is to the effect which would be produced from the acting of one of them alone, as the ſum of the two powers is to that power which acts alone.

LET A and B be any two beings, poſſeſſed with unequal ſimilar, and conſpiring powers or qualities; and let C be any portion of time, and let DE be the effect that is produced from the exertion of A's power

power in the time C, and F that which is produced from the exertion of C's power in the ſame time C, when each act alone, and G H the effect that is produced from the common exertion of both the beings A and B, preſſing upon or influencing one and the ſame being in the ſame time C: I ſay, the effect GH is to the effect DE, as the ſum of both the powers is to A's power. For ſince the powers that A and B poſſeſs, are not only ſimilar but conſpiring *; therefore if the powers that A a B poſſeſs were equal to one another, the ſame effect would be produced by them, preſſing upon, or in-



* Hyp.

fluencing the ſame being, at different, but equal times of exertion *. And conſequently when both theſe powers are exerted at the ſame time, ſo as to preſs upon, or influence the ſame being, the effect that is produced will be double the effect that is produced by the exertion of one of them alone. Again, if A's power be double of B's power, then may A's power be ſuppoſed divided into two parts, each equal to B's power, and in this caſe the ſame being will in the ſame time be preſſed upon, or influenced by three equal ſimilar and conſpiring powers, the effect G H produced by the conjunct exertion of them, will be thrice the effect F, which is produced by one of them, *viz.* B's power alone; and D E, which is the effect of A's power, will

* Def. 7. of this.

will be double F, conſequently the effect GH will be one third part greater than the effect DE, and the powers that A and B poſſeſs added together, will be a third part greater than the power that A poſſeſſes; after the ſame manner it may be demonſtrated, that if the power that A poſſeſſes be thrice B's power, the effect GH, which is produced from the exertion of them in the ſame time, preſſing upon, or influencing the ſame being, will be one fourth part greater than the effect DE, and the ſum of the powers added together will alſo be one fourth part greater than the power that A poſſeſſes, and ſo on univerſally; therefore as the effect GH, is to the effect DE, ſo is the ſum of the powers of the beings A and B, to the power

* Def. of four Proportionals.

that A possesses*. Therefore *the effect that is produced, from the conjunct acting of two unequal similar and conspiring powers, pressing upon, or influencing the same being in the same time, is to that which would be produced from one of them alone, as the sum of the powers is to that particular power*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION IX.

THEOREM VIII.

Any one of the powers or qualities, which a dependent being possesses, may be diminished.

LET

LET A be any dependent being, and C any one of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes: ſince C is one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being, it may be conſidered as a dependent being itſelf; and I ſay, C may be diminiſhed. For becauſe C is a dependent being *, its exiſtence will be the effect of ſome other being †, and let that other being be B. Then becauſe the exiſtence of C is the effect of the being B ‡, C will be an effect of which B is the cauſe; but effects are dependent upon the cauſes that did produce them ||, therefore the exiſtence of C is dependent upon B. Then becauſe the exiſtence of C is dependent upon B, B will either be the cauſe that continues C in its ex-



* Hyp.

† Def. 27. L. 1.

‡ Conſtruction.

|| Ax. 11. L. 1.

iſtence, or B can act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy its effect §. If B be the cauſe of continuing C in its exiſtence, then will the exiſtence of C be terminated by B's ceaſing to exert the power by which C is continued in its exiſtence *; wherefore in this caſe the power or quality of the being A, will not only be diminiſhed, but totally deſtroyed.

§ Prop. 27. L. 1.

* Prop. 18. L. 1.



Again, let B not ceaſe exerting the whole power by which any one power or quality of A is continued in its exiſtence. Let DC repreſent the power of B, by whoſe exertion the power or quality F of the being A is continued in its exiſtence, and let B exert the part DE, of

of the power DC; then becauſe the effects produced by the exertion of unequal powers in the ſame time, are in proportion to theſe powers *, therefore DC is to DE, as the effect F is to the effect that DE will produce; but DC is greater than DE†, therefore the effect F is greater than the effect that will be produced by DE; conſequently by the exertion of DE only, the effect F, which is one of the powers or qualities that the being A poſſeſſes, will be diminiſhed. Laſtly, if the exertion of the power DC does not continue the power or quality F of the being A in its exiſtence, but can act in oppoſition to that cauſe, ſo as to deſtroy the whole, or part of the effect; then by B's exerting of that power, the exiſtence of the whole

* Prop. 2. of this.

† Conſtruction.

power or quality F, or the exiſtence of part of it in proportion to the power DC, which the being B poſſeſſes, will be deſtroyed*; conſequently in this reſpect the power F, or quality of the being A, will be diminiſhed. Therefore, *any one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being may be diminiſhed*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 19. L. 1. and Prop. 6. of this.

PROPOSITION X.

THEOREM IX.

None of the powers or qualities, that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, can be diminiſhed.

LET

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, BC one of the powers or qualities it poſſeſſes: I ſay, that BC cannot be diminiſhed. For if it be poſſible for BC to be diminiſhed, let that part by which it is diminiſhed be DC; then becauſe DC is terminated in its exiſtence *, and DC may be conſidered by itſelf as one being. But that being whoſe exiſtence may terminate, is a dependent being †; therefore DC is a dependent being, and its exiſtence is dependent on ſome other being ‡, let that being if poſſible be E, but DC is one of the powers or qualities of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being §; wherefore its exiſtence is independent



* Hyp.

† Prop. 42. L. 1.

‡ Prop. 16. Lib. 1.

§ Hyp.

dent on any other being whatſoever ‖, and conſequently independent of E; therefore the exiſtence of D C is both dependent and independent of E *, which is abſurd; from that abſurdity it follows, that BC cannot be diminiſhed, conſequently no power or quality that the being A poſſeſſes, can be diminiſhed. Therefore, *none of the powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, can be diminiſhed*; which was to be demonſtrated.

‖ Def. 26. Lib. 1.

* Ax. Lib. 1.

PROPOSITION XI.

THEOREM X.

That being, any one of whoſe powers or qualities may be diminiſhed, is a dependent being.

LET

LET A be any being, and BC any one of the powers or qualities it poſſeſſes, and let it be poſſible for BC to be diminiſhed: I ſay, A is a dependent being. For if A is not a dependent being, its exiſtence will be independent of any other being whatſoever, and conſequently A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being *. Now ſince A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and BC is one of the powers or qualities it poſſeſſes, BC cannot be diminiſhed † contrary to the hypotheſis; therefore A is not a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and conſequently A is a dependent being. Therefore, *that being, any one of whoſe powers or qualities can be diminiſhed, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.



* Def. 26. Lib. 1.

† Prop. 8. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XII.

THEOREM XI.

That being, none of whose powers or qualities can be diminished, is a self-existing and independent being.

LET A be such a being, none of whose powers or qualities can be diminished: I say, that A is a self-existing and independent being. For let BC be one of its powers or qualities; now if A is not a self-existing and independent being, its existence will be dependent on some other being *; therefore A is a dependent being †, and consequently BC is one of the powers or qualities of



* Prop. 16. L. 1.

† Def. 27. L. 1.

of a dependent being, but any one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being may be diminiſhed *; therefore BC can be diminiſhed, but BC cannot be diminiſhed †; wherefore BC both can and cannot be diminiſhed, which is abſurd; from that abſurdity it follows, that the exiſtence of A is independent of any other being. But a being, whoſe exiſtence is independent of any other being, is a ſelf exiſting and independent being ‡, conſequently the being A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

* Prop. 9. of this.

† Hyp.

‡ Def. 26. L. 1.

Therefore, *that being, none of whoſe powers or qualities can be diminiſhed, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIII.

THEOREM XII.

The powers or qualities, which a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, cannot be augmented.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting being, and BC one of its powers or qualities: I ſay, BC cannot be augmented. For if it be poſſible for BC to be augmented, let CD repreſent that part which is ſo augmented. Then becauſe CD is a being produced, and antecedent to its exiſtence a time may be aſſigned * ; therefore CD is a temporary being †, and conſequently its exiſtence



* Hyp.

† Def. 21. L. 1.

ſtence depends on ſome other being *, but CD is a power or quality of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being†, and therefore its exiſtence is independent of any other being whatſoever; wherefore the exiſtence of CD is both dependent and independent on ſome other being §, which is abſurd. Wherefore the exiſtence of CD cannot have had a beginning, conſequently the power CD of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, cannot be augmented.

* Prop. 4. L. 1.

† Hyp.

§ Ax. 9. L. 1.

Therefore, *the powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, cannot be augmented*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIV.

THEOREM XIII.

That being, any one of whoſe powers or qualities can be augmented, is a dependent being.

CD LET A be any being, and C one of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes, and let the power CD be capable of being augmented: I ſay, that the being A is a dependent being. For the exiſtence of A is either dependent or independent of ſome other being *; if the exiſtence of A be independent of any other being, then will A be a ſelf-exiſting and independent being †, and CD will be one of the powers



* Ax. 10. L. 1.

† Def. 26. L. 1.

powers or qualities of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being; but none of the powers or qualities of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being can be augmented *, wherefore D cannot be augmented, but C D can be augmented †; therefore it can and cannot be augmented, which is abſurd. From this abſurdity it follows, that the exiſtence of A is not independent of any other being, conſequently ‡ A is not a ſelf-exiſting being; but the exiſtence of every being, which is not ſelf-exiſting, is dependent upon ſome other being §; therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent on ſome other being, which let be B □ B. Then becauſe the exiſtence of A is dependent on the being B ‖, and effects are dependent upon the cauſes that did produce them *, therefore the exiſtence of A is an effect

* Prop. 13. of this. C D

† Hyp.

‡ Def. 26. Lib. 1.

§ Prop. 16. L. 1.

‖ Hyp.

* Ax. 11. L. 1.

of which the being B is the cauſe. But that being, whoſe exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being, is a dependent being *, wherefore A is a dependent being. Therefore, *that being, any one of whoſe powers or qualities can be augmented, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Def. 27. L. 1.

PROPOSITION XV.
THEOREM XIV.

No change or mutation can be made on any one of the powers or qualities, which a ſelf-exiſting being poſſeſſes; or all the powers or qualities which a ſelf-exiſting being poſſeſſes, from eternity to eternity, were, and will be the ſame unaltered, or unchanged.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, C D one of the powers or qualities it poſſeſſes:

ſes: I ſay, that no change or mutation can be made on CD. For if it be poſſible for any change or mutation to be made on CD, that change or mutation muſt either be an augmentation, or diminution of CD; therefore the power or quality CD may be either augmented or diminiſhed: but CD is one of the powers or qualities that the being A poſſeſſes *, and any being that may have any of its powers or qualities augmented or diminiſhed, is a dependent being †; wherefore the being A is a dependent being, and its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being ‡, but A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being §, and its exiſtence can be the effect of no other being ‖, which is abſurd. Therefore, no change or mutation can be made

* Hyp.

† Prop. 11. and 14. of this.

‡ Def. 27. L. 1.

§ Hyp.

‖ Def. 26. L. 1.

on any of the powers or qualities that the being A possesses, and consequently from eternity to eternity they will be the same unchanged or altered. Therefore, *no change or mutation can be made on any of the powers or qualities which a self-existing and independent being possesses*; *or the powers or qualities which a self-existing and independent being possesses from eternity to eternity, were, and will be the same*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XVI.

THEOREM XV.

Those powers or qualities of any being, which hath certain limits or boundaries, may either be augmented, or diminished.

LET A be any being, BC one of its powers or qualities, and let

let BC have certain limits or boundaries: I ſay, BC may either be augmented or diminiſhed;

for becauſe BC has certain limits or boundaries*, therefore BC is a finite being †, and conſequently however great BC is, it may be doubled, tripled, or any multiple whatſoever of it may be taken; therefore BC may be augmented, but BC is one of the powers that the being A poſſeſſes ‡. But that being, any of whoſe powers or qualities may be augmented, is a dependent being §, therefore A is a dependent being: Now becauſe A is a dependent being, and any one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being may be diminiſhed ||, therefore BC, which is one of the powers or qualities of A, may be diminiſhed.

* Hyp.

† Def. 5. L. 1.

‡ Hyp.

§ Prop. 14. of this.

|| Prop. 11. of this.

Therefore, *thoſe powers or qualities of any being that hath certain limits or boundaries, may be either augmented or diminiſhed*; which was to be demonſtrated.

Cor. From this propoſition it follows, that any being, whoſe powers or qualities have limits or boundaries, is a dependent being.

PROPOSITION XVII.

THEOREM XVI.

The powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting being poſſeſſes, are without limits or boundaries, or they are infinite.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and BC any one of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes: I ſay, BC is without limits or boundaries, or it is infinite.

infinite. For if it be poſſible for BC to have certain limits or boundaries, then becauſe any being that has certain limits or boundaries, may be augmented or diminiſhed *; wherefore BC may be augmented or diminiſhed, but BC is one of the powers that the being A poſſeſſes †. And any being, whoſe powers may be augmented or diminiſhed, is a dependent being ‡, therefore A is a dependent being, and its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being §; but its exiſtence is independent of any other being whatſoever ‖, and is the effect of no other being, becauſe it is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, which is abſurd. From that abſurdity it follows, that BC has no limits or boundaries; but any being that has no limits



* Prop. 16. of this.

† Hyp.

‡ Prop. 11 and 14. of this.

§ Def. 27. Lib. 1.

‖ Def. 26. Lib. 1.

* Def. 8. Lib. 1. or boundaries, is infinite*, therefore BC is infinite.

Therefore, *the powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, are without limits or boundaries, or they are infinite*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

THEOREM XVII.

That being, whoſe powers or qualities are finite, is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, and BC one of its powers or qualities, and let BC be finite; then becauſe BC is a finite being, it has limits or boundaries †. But a being, whoſe powers or qualities have limits or boundaries, is a dependent



† Def. 5. L. 1.

pendent being *, and BC is one of the powers or qualities of the being A†, therefore A is a dependent being.

* Cor. Prop. 16. of this.

† Hyp.

Therefore, *any being, whoſe powers or qualities are finite, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XIX.

THEOREM XVIII.

The exertion of the powers or qualities which a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, may preſs upon, or influence any other being whatſoever, that ever did or can exiſt.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and B any other being whatſoever: I ſay, that the exertion of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes, may preſs upon, or influence the being B. For if it be

A ⊙
B □

be poſſible for the powers or qualities of A not to be able to preſs upon or influence the being B, then will the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes have certain limits or boundaries, and conſequently are finite *. But that being whoſe powers or qualities are finite, is a dependent being †, conſequently A is a dependent being. Again, becauſe A is a dependent being, its exiſtence will be the effect of ſome other being ‡; but A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being §, and its exiſtence is independent of any other being whatſoever ‖, and conſequently its exiſtence can be the effect of no other being, which is abſurd. From this Abſurdity it follows, that the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes, may preſs upon, or influence the being B. Therefore, *the exertion of the powers or qualities, which*

* Def. 5. L. 1.

† Prop. 18. of this.

‡ Def. 27. Lib. 1.

§ Hyp.

‖ Def. 26. Lib. 1.

which a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, may preſs upon, or influence any other being whatſoever, that ever did or can exiſt; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XX.

THEOREM XIX.

If the exertion of the powers or qualities of any being, preſs upon, or influence any other being; ſome of the powers or qualities of that being ſo preſſed upon, or influenced by the other being, will ſuffer ſome change or mutation upon the receiving that preſſure or influence.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the exertion of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes, preſs upon, or influence the being B: I ſay,

I ſay, ſome of the powers or qualities that B poſſeſſes, will ſuffer ſome change or mutation upon B's receiving that preſſure or influence. For becauſe B is actuated by a preſſure or influence that ariſes from the exertion of the powers or qualities of A *; therefore that preſſure or influence with which B is actuated, is an effect of which the exertion of the power or qualities of A is the cauſe †, which effect will either conſpire with, or be contrary to ſome of the powers or qualities of B, or neither of them. If it be conſpiring with, or contrary to any of the powers or qualities of B, then will ſome of the powers or qualities that B poſſeſſes, be increaſed or diminiſhed, by that new received

* Hyp.

† Def. 23. L. 1.

power*, and conſequently the powers or qualities that B poſſeſſes, will ſuffer a change or mutation upon its receiving that preſſure or influence. But if that effect be neither conſpiring with, nor contrary to any of the powers or qualities that B poſſeſſes, that preſſure or influence with which B is actuated, cannot affect any of its powers or qualities, and conſequently cannot affect the being B†; and the being B is preſſed upon or influenced by that exertion, and therefore is affected by it, which is abſurd. Therefore, *if the exertion of the power or qualities of any being, preſs upon, or influence any other being, ſome of the powers or qualities of that other being, ſo preſſed upon by the other being, will ſuffer ſome change or mutation, upon its receiving that preſſure or influence*;

* Def. 6 and 8. of this.

† Hyp.

influence; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXI.

THEOREM XX.

The exertion of the powers or qualities of any being, that ever did or can exiſt, cannot preſs upon, nor influence a ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and B any being whatſoever: I ſay, the exertion of the powers or qualities that B poſſeſſes, cannot preſs upon, or influence the ſelf-exiſting being A; for if it be poſſible for the exertion of the powers or qualities that B poſ-

A ⊙
B □

B poſſeſſes, to preſs upon, or influence the ſelf-exiſting being A; then will the exertion of the powers or qualities of B act upon A, and conſequently ſome effect will be produced by them in A, which effect will cauſe a change or mutation of ſome of the powers or qualities of A *; but A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being †, and therefore no change or mutation can be made in any of the powers or qualities which A poſſeſſes ‡, which is abſurd. From this abſurdity it follows, that the exertion of the powers or qualities that B poſſeſſes, cannot preſs upon, or influence the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A. Therefore, *the exertion of the powers or qualities that any being whatſoever poſſeſſes, that ever did or can exiſt, cannot preſs upon, or influence a ſelf-exiſting*

*Prop. 20. of this.
† Hyp.
‡ Prop. 15. of this.

exiſting and independent being; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXII.

THEOREM XXI.

Every dependent being, may be preſſed upon or influenced by the exertion of the powers or qualities of ſome other being.

LET A be a dependent being: I ſay, that A may be preſſed upon or influenced by the exertion of the powers or qualities of ſome other being. For becauſe the exertion of the powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, can preſs upon, or influence any being whatſoever, that ever did or can exiſt;

A ⊙

exiſt * ; therefore the exertion of the powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, may preſs upon, or influence the dependent being A. Therefore, *every dependent being may be preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities that a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes* ; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 19. of this.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

THEOREM XXII.

That being, on any of whoſe powers or qualities a change or mutation can be made, is a dependent being.

LET A be a being, upon any of whoſe powers or qualities ſome change or mutation can be made: I

 ſay,

say, A is a dependent being; for let CD be one of the powers or qualities of A, on which



some change or mutation can be made. Now because the change or mutation that is made on CD, will either augment or diminish it; therefore A is such a being, whose powers or qualities may be either augmented or diminished: but a being, whose powers or qualities may be either augmented or diminished, is a dependent being*, wherefore A is a dependent being.

* Prop. 11 and 14. of this.

Therefore, *that being, on any of whose powers or qualities a change or mutation can be made, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXIV.

THEOREM XXIII.

That being, which may be preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of any other being, is a dependent being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the being A be preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of B: I ſay, A is a dependent being. For becauſe the being A is preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of B *; therefore ſome change or mutation will be made on the powers or qualities of

A ⊙
B □

* Hyp.

A, by that pressure or influence with which it is actuated from the exertion of the powers or qualities of B †; but a being, on whose powers or qualities some change or mutation can be made, is a dependent being ‡, wherefore A is a dependent being.

† Prop. 20. of this.

‡ Prop. 23. of this.

Therefore, *that being which may be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of any other being, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonstrated.

This proposition may be otherwise demonstrated, as follows.

For if the existence of A is not dependent on any other being whatsoever, then is A a self-existing and independent being *; but the powers or qualities of a self-existing and independent being, cannot be pressed

* Def. 26. Lib. 1.

ſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of any other being whatſoever, that ever did or can exiſt †; therefore A cannot be preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of the being B, contrary to the hypotheſis, which is abſurd. From this abſurdity it follows, that the exiſtence of A is dependent on ſome other being, and conſequently the exiſtence of A is an effect of which that other being upon which its exiſtence depends is the cauſe; but a being, whoſe exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being, is a dependent being *, wherefore A is a dependent being. Therefore, *that being, which can be preſſed upon, or influenced,* &c. which was to be demonſtrated.

† Prop. 21. of this.

* Def. 27. L. 1.

PROPOSITION XXV.

THEOREM XXIV.

Two, or any multitude of ſelf-exiſting and independent beings, never did, nor can exiſt.

FOR becauſe a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, from eternity did, and to eternity will exiſt *; therefore, if two or any multitude of ſelf-exiſting beings do exiſt, they always did and will exiſt. Let therefore, if poſſible, two ſuch beings exiſt, which let be repreſented by A and B; then becauſe A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being, the exertion of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes, can preſs upon, or influence, any

A ⊙
B □

* Prop. 41 and 45. Lib. 1.

any other being whatſoever, that ever did or can exiſt *; therefore the exertion of the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes, can preſs upon, or influence, the being B. But any being that can be preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of another being, is a dependent being †; therefore B is a dependent being, and its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being ‡. But B is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being §, and its exiſtence is independent of any other being whatſoever, that ever did or can exiſt ‖, which is abſurd; wherefore both A and B cannot be ſelf-exiſting and independent beings. After the ſame manner it may be demonſtrated, that any multitude of ſelf-exiſting and independent beings cannot exiſt.

* Prop. 19. of this.

† Prop. 24. of this.

‡ Def. 27. Lib. 1.

§ Hyp.

‖ Def. 26. L. 1.

Therefore, *two, or any multitude of self-existing and independent beings, never did, nor can exist*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

THEOREM XXV.

One, and only one self-existing and independent being, ever did, or can exist, and the powers or qualities of that being are infinite, invariable, and unchangeable.

FOR because some being from all eternity existed *; and a being which from all eternity existed, is a self-existing and independent being †; also a self-existing and independent being to all eternity will exist ‡. Therefore, one self-existing and

*Prop. 6. L. 1.

†Prop. 39. L. 1.

‡Prop. 45. Lib. 1.

and independent being, from all eternity has, and to all eternity will exiſt. Again, becauſe the powers or qualities of a ſelf-exiſting being are infinite *, invariable, or incapable of any mutation; therefore one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, poſſeſſed with powers or qualities, unvariable or incapable of any mutation, from all eternity did, and to all eternity will exiſt. Neither is it poſſible for any more ſuch beings to be than one; for if there could, then would it be poſſible for two or more ſelf-exiſting and independent beings to exiſt, which is abſurd †. From this abſurdity it follows, *that one, and only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, from all eternity did, does, and to all eternity will exiſt, and the powers or qualities of that being are infinite,*

* Prop. 15. of this, and Prop. 17. of this.

† Prop 25. of this.

infinite, invariable, and unchangeable; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

THEOREM XXVI.

A being, which can exist without acting, is possessed with properties or qualities, different from active powers.

LET A be any being that can exist without acting: I say, that A is possessed with other properties than active powers. For let BC be any portion of time, and D the point of duration that terminates the last action of A; and DC, that part of time that immediately flows after the last action of A is terminated.



nated. Now becauſe A is a being that does exiſt in the time DC *, it will have ſome properties; for if it has none, then will A be nothing †, and conſequently A is no exiſting being, contrary to the Hypotheſis, which is abſurd. Therefore the being A, in the time DC, has ſome properties, but theſe cannot be active properties, becauſe the laſt action that it was capable of exerting, was terminated in the point of duration D ‡; wherefore the being A is poſſeſſed with properties, which are not active powers.

* Hyp.

† Ax. 1. L. 1.

‡ Hyp. and Conſtruction.

Therefore, *a being that can exiſt without acting, is poſſeſſed with properties or qualities, different from active powers*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

THEOREM XXVII.

A being that is possessed with no power or quality different from an active power, cannot exist without acting.

LET A be any being that is possessed of no power or quality different from an active power: I say, that the being A cannot exist without acting. For if it be possible for A to exist without acting, let BC represent any portion of time, and D the point of duration that terminates the last act that A exerted, and DC that part of time that immediately flows after the point of duration D. Now since the being



A

A continues to exiſt in the part of duration DC *, it will exiſt without acting; but any being that does or can exiſt without acting, is poſſeſſed of ſome other powers or qualities different from active powers †; therefore the being A is poſſeſſed of ſome other powers or qualities different from active powers, contrary to the hypotheſis, which is abſurd; conſequently the being A cannot exiſt after the point of duration D, and its exiſtence will terminate in the ſame point of duration, in which the laſt action that it is capable of exerting is terminated; wherefore the being A cannot exiſt without acting. Therefore, *a being that is poſſeſſed with no powers or qualities different from active powers, cannot exiſt without acting*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Hyp.

† Prop. 27. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXIX.

THEOREM XXVIII.

The cauſe of the exertion of the power of any being, which is the cauſe of an effect, is either a ſelf-determining power or volition in the being itſelf: or the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being, upon that being which exerts that power.

LET A be any being, BC one of the powers that A poſſeſſes, and let the effect D be produced from the exertion of the power BC: I ſay, the cauſe of the exertion of the power BC, is either a ſelf-determining power, or volition in A, or it is the immediate preſſure or influence of

of ſome other being upon the being A. For becauſe the exertion of the power BC, in order to produce the effect D, is itſelf an effect, and conſequently is owing to ſome Cauſe *; that cauſe will either be the being A itſelf, ſome other being, or no being. Firſt it cannot ariſe from no being, otherwiſe there would be an effect produced, to wit, the exertion of the power BC, that does produce the effect D without a cauſe, which is abſurd †; therefore the exertion of the power BC, is either owing to ſome other being, or to A itſelf: if it be owing to ſome other being, let that being be E. Now becauſe the exertion of the power BC, is owing to the being E ‡, therefore



* Ax. 2. L. 1.

† Ax. 2. L. 1.

‡ Hyp.

fore the being A could not exert the power BC, independent of E; and conſequently A will be preſſed upon or influenced by the being E, to cauſe it to exert the power BC, for the production of the effect D.

Laſtly, if the exertion of the power BC be owing to no other being but A itſelf, then will the cauſe of the exertion of the power BC, be the determination of the being A, independent of any other being, or without the immediate preſſure or influence of any other being, and conſequently the cauſe of the exertion of the power BC, for producing the effect D, will be an act of the being A of its own will, by which it determines itſelf to exert that power, without the immediate preſſure or influence of any other being; but

that power by which any being acts of its own will, without the immediate preſſure or influence of any other being, is a ſelf-determining power or volition in the acting being*; wherefore the cauſe of the exertion of the power B C, is in this caſe the ſelf-determining power or volition of the being A. Therefore, *the cauſe of the exertion of the power of any being, which is the cauſe of an effect, is either a ſelf-determining power or volition in the being itſelf: or the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being on that being which exerts that power*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Def. 1. of this.

Corollary. From this propoſition it follows, that if the cauſe of the exertion of a power in any being,

be not the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being, it will be the ſelf-determining power or volition in the being exerting that power. And if the cauſe of the exertion of the power be not a ſelf-determining power in the being itſelf, it will be the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being on the being that exerts the power.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXX.

THEOREM XXIX.

If a ſelf-exiſting and independent being exerts any power or quality, and conſequently from that exertion an effect is produced, the cauſe of that exertion will be a ſelf-determining power, or volition, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being does poſſeſs.

LET A repreſent a ſelf-exiſtent and independent being, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of one of the powers or qualities of A: I ſay, the cauſe of the exertion of the power or quality of A, that does produce the effect D, is

A ⊙
D □

a ſelf-determining power or volition in the being A. For if the cauſe of the exertion of the power or quality of A, that does produce the effect D, be not a ſelf-determining power or volition of A, it will be the preſſure or influence of ſome other being *; which preſſure or influence will be the exertion of a power or quality that ſome other being poſſeſſes †, conſequently the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, may be preſſed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of ſome other being, which is abſurd ‡. From this abſurdity it follows, that the cauſe of the exertion of the power or quality of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, that produces the effect D, is a ſelf-determining power or volition that A poſſeſſes. Therefore,

* Cor. Prop. 29. of this.

† Def. 22. L. 1.

‡ Prop. 21. of this.

fore, *if a ſelf-exiſting and independent being exert any power or quality, and conſequently from that exertion an effect is produced, the cauſe of that exertion will be a ſelf-determining power, or volition, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being does poſſeſs*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

THEOREM XXX.

The exiſtence of the firſt temporary being, is the effect that ariſes from the exertion of ſome of the powers or qualities of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

LET A repreſent the firſt temporary being: I ſay, that the

exiſtence of A, is the effect that ariſes from the exertion of the powers or qualities of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For becauſe A is a tempo-

* Hypoth. rary being*, its exiſtence is dependent on ſome other antecedent exiſting be-

† Prop. 4. Lib. 1. ing †; but no being exiſts antecedent to A, but the ſelf-exiſting and inde-

‡ Hyp. and 41. Prop. L. 1. pendent being ‡; therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent on the ſelf-exiſting and independent being. Again, becauſe the exiſtence of A is an effect produced, this effect will

§ Ax. 2. L. 1. have a cauſe §, and the exiſtence of the cauſe of any effect, is antecedent

‖ Prop. 2. L. 1. to the exiſtence of that effect ‖; wherefore the exiſtence of the cauſe of A's exiſtence, is antecedent to A's exiſtence: but the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the only being that

that exiſts antecedent to A *; therefore the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the cauſe of the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being A. But that being, which is the cauſe of the exiſtence of any effect, exerts ſome power or quality it poſſeſſes, for the production of that effect †; wherefore the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being A, is the effect that ariſes from the exertion of ſome of the powers or qualities that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes.

* Hyp.

† Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

Therefore, *the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being, is the effect that ariſes from the exertion of ſome of the powers or qualities of a ſelf-exiſting and independent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

THEOREM XXXI

The ſelf-exiſting and independent being does poſſeſs a ſelf-determining power, or volition, and that ſelf-determining power, or volition, is the cauſe of the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being.

LET A repreſent the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, B the firſt temporary being: I ſay, the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, is poſſeſſed of a ſelf-determining power or volition, and that ſelf-determining power or volition, is the cauſe of the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being B. For becauſe the exiſtence

A ⊙
B □

exiſtence of the firſt temporary being B, is the effect that ariſes from the exertion of ſome of the powers or qualities of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A *, and the cauſe of the exertion of any power or quality of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is a ſelf-determining power, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being does poſſeſs †; therefore the cauſe of the exertion of that power or quality of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, which does produce the exiſtence of B, is a ſelf-determining power or volition that A does poſſeſs, and will be the cauſe of B's exiſtence; conſequently the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, does poſſeſs a ſelf-determining power, or volition, which ſelf-determining power, or volition,

*Prop. 31. of this.

†Prop. 30. of this.

volition, is the cauſe of the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being B's exiſtence. Therefore, *the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, does poſſeſs a ſelf-determining power, which ſelf-determining power is the cauſe of the exiſtence of the firſt temporary being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

THEOREM XXXII.

No time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-determining power or volition of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, ever did, or can ceaſe from acting.

LET A repreſent the ſelf-exiſting and independent being: I ſay, no

no time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-determining power or volition of A, ever did, or can ceaſe from acting; for becauſe the ſelf-determining power or volition of a being, is a power by which it determines or orders its actions, without the preſſure or influence of any other being*; and that ordering is the exertion of the ſelf-determining power or volition of the being A, therefore that determination, or ordering, is † itſelf an action of the being A, and conſequently the ſelf-determining power or volition of A, is a power that conſiſts of acting alone; and therefore the ſelf-determining power of A, may itſelf be conſidered as a being, and conſequently



* Def. 1. of this.

† Def. 23. L. 1.

quently does poſſeſs no power or quality different from an active power. But a being, that does poſſeſs no power different from an active power, cannot exiſt without acting*; therefore, the ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, cannot exiſt without acting. And if it were poſſible for the ſelf-determining power or volition of A, at any time to ceaſe from acting, then would the exiſtence of that power terminate in the ſame point of duration in which it ceaſes from acting†, and conſequently a power or quality of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, would not only be diminiſhed, but would terminate in its exiſtence, which is abſurd‡; wherefore no time can be aſſigned when the ſelf-deter-

†Prop. 27. of this.

† Ax. 2. of this.

‡Prop. 10 of this, and Prop. 45. Lib. 1.

determining power or volition of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A, ever did, or can ceaſe from acting. Therefore, *no time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-determining power or volition of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, ever did, or ever can ceaſe from acting*; which was to be demonſtrated.

Corollary. From this and the two preceding propoſitions it follows, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is poſſeſſed with the powers of acting, thinking, willing, and determining.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

THEOREM XXXIII.

The ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, from all eternity did, and to all eternity will continue to act.

FOR becauſe no time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, did or can ceaſe from acting *; therefore the ſelf determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, from eternity did, and to eternity will continue to act. For if the ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting

* Prop. 33. of this.

ing and independent being, did not act from all eternity, and will not continue to act to all eternity, then may a time be aſſigned when the ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, does not, or will not act, which is abſurd *. Therefore, *the ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, from all eternity has acted, and to all eternity will continue to act*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 33. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXXV.

THEOREM XXXIV.

If no time can be aſſigned, when a given being does not, or cannot act, that given being is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being.

LET A repreſent a being, and if no time can be aſſigned, when A does not, or cannot act: I ſay, A is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For becauſe no time can be aſſigned, when A does not, or cannot act *; therefore the being A has acted from all eternity, and to all eternity will continue to act. But a being exiſts in all the points of duration in which it acts †, therefore the being A has exiſted

A ⊙

* Hyp.

† Ax. 4. L. 1.

exiſted from all eternity, and to all eternity will continue to exiſt. But a being which exiſted from all eternity, and to all eternity will exiſt, is a ſelf-exiſting and independent being*, wherefore the being A is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being. Therefore, *if no time can be aſſigned, when a given being does not, or cannot act, that given being is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 39 and 43. L. 1.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.
THEOREM XXXV.

A time may be aſſigned, when any dependent being did not, or may not act.

LET A be any dependent being: I ſay, a time may be aſſigned, when A did not, or may not act. For if it be not poſſible to aſſign a time, when A did not, or cannot act; then becauſe no time can be aſſigned, when the being A did not, or could not act, that being is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being *; therefore A is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and conſequently A's exiſtence is independent of any other being whatſoever ‡; but A is a dependent being †, and its exiſtence is the effect

A ⊙

*Prop. 35. of this.

‡ Def. 26. Lib. 1.

† Hyp.

fect of ſome other being ‡, and conſequently the exiſtence of A is dependent upon that other being whoſe effect the exiſtence of A is, which is abſurd. From that abſurdity it follows, that a time may be aſſigned, when the dependent being A did not, or may not act. Therefore, *a time may be aſſigned, when any dependent being did not, or may not act*; which was to be demonſtrated.

‡ Def. 27. Lib. 1.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.
THEOREM XXXVI.

No time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-exiſting and independent being did not, or cannot act.

LET A repreſent the ſelf-exiſting and independent being: I ſay, no time can be aſſigned, when A did not,

not, or cannot act. For becauſe the acting of a A ⊙ being, is the exertion of any of the powers it poſſeſſes, and by which it preſſes upon, or influences itſelf, or any other being *; but A is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, and therefore is poſſeſſed of a ſelf-determining power, or volition †; therefore the exertion of the ſelf-determining power, or volition, that is, the acting of the ſelf-determining power, or volition, will be the acting of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being A. But no time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-determining power, or volition, of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being ceaſes from acting ‡; therefore, no time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-exſting and independent being A, does

* Def. 23. Lib. 1.

† Prop. 32. of this.

‡ Prop. 33. of this.

does not, or cannot act. Therefore, *no time can be aſſigned, when the ſelf-exiſting and independent being does not, or cannot act*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

THEOREM XXXVII.

If a time can be aſſigned, when any given being did not, or cannot act, that is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, and let it be poſſible A ☉ to aſſign a time, when A did not, or could not act: I ſay, A is a dependent being. For if A is not a dependent being, the exiſtence of A will be independent of any other being whatſoever, and conſequently A is a ſelf-exiſting and independent

being*; but no time can be assigned, when the self-existing and independent being did not, or cannot act†, wherefore no time can be assigned, when the being A did not, or cannot act; which is absurd‡. From that absurdity it follows, that the being A is not a self-existing and independent being; but the existence of every being that is not a self-existing and independent being, is dependent upon some other being§; therefore the existence of A is dependent upon some other being, and consequently the existence of A will be the effect of that other being upon whom its existence depends; therefore the given being A is a dependent being. Therefore, *if a time can be assigned, when any given being did not, or cannot act, that being is a dependent*

* Def. 26. L. 1.

† Prop 37. of this.

‡ Hyp.

§ Prop. 16. Lib. 1.

pendent being; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.
THEOREM XXXVIII.

Any material being may not, in every part of duration that can be aſſigned, poſſeſs the ſame powers or qualities.

LET A repreſent any material being, and BC any part of time, D any point of duration in the time BC, whatever powers or qualities the material being A poſſeſſes in the point of duration D: I ſay, it is poſſible to aſſign a time when the material being A will poſſeſs powers or qualities, different from what it does poſſeſs in the given point of duration D. For let the material being A be ſuppoſed in motion in

the point of duration D, E, the velocity with which it moves, and F the force of its motion; then will the material being



A, in the point of duration D, be actuated by a particular force, to cauſe it move with the velocity E *; but the motion of any body may be either an accelerated, a retarded motion, or it may be an equable motion. If the motion of the being A be either accelerated or retarded, then will the force, and conſequently the velocity with which A will move, in the point of duration G, poſterior to the given point of duration D, be greater or ſmaller than that which it did move with

* Lemma 2. of this.

with at the point of duration D, and that in proportion to the increment or decrement of force with which it is actuated at the point of duration G*; conſequently both the force and velocity of A's motion, in the points of duration D and G, will be different, and therefore the powers or qualities that the material being A poſſeſſes, in the points of duration D and G, will not be the ſame. Again, if the motion of A in the point of duration D, be an equable motion, then may the material being A, in other points of duration, ſuch as G poſterior to D, be actuated by a force equal and contrary to that with which it moves in the point of duration D, and conſequently the material being A, in the point of duration G, being actuated with two

* Lemma 2. of this.

equal

equal and contrary forces, these forces will destroy each other's effect* ; but the effect of the force, with which the being A was actuated in the point of duration D, was the motion with which it moved with the velocity E; therefore that motion in the point of duration G, will be destroyed ; wherefore in the points of duration D and G, the material being A will not be possessed with the same powers or qualities. Therefore, *any material being may not, in every part of duration that can be assigned, possess the same powers or qualities* ; which was to be demonstrated.

* Ax. 12. Lib. 1.

The truth of this proposition is confirmed by all experiments that can be made on material beings. And though we have proved, that any

any material being may not poſſeſs the ſame powers or qualities, in every part of duration that can be aſſigned in the particular quality of motion; yet the ſame may be demonſtrated of any other quality or power matter is endued with, but any one of them is ſufficient.

PROPOSITION XL.

THEOREM XXXIX.

A change or mutation may be made on the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being poſſeſſes.

LET A be any material being: I ſay, a change or mutation may be made on the powers or qualities that A poſſeſſes. A ⊙

ſeſſes. For becauſe the powers or qualities that any material being poſſeſſes, may not be the ſame in every part of duration that can be aſſigned*, therefore the powers or qualities of the being A, in different parts of duration that may be aſſigned, may not be the ſame, and conſequently the particular powers or qualities that at any given time the being A poſſeſſes, may undergo a change or mutation. Therefore, *a change or mutation may be made on the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being poſſeſſes*; which was to be demonſtrated.

*Prop. 39. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XLI.

THEOREM XL.

Matter is a dependent being.

BEcauſe that being, which can have any change or mutation, made on any of the powers or qualites it poſſeſſes, is a dependent being *; but a change or mutation can be made on ſome of the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being poſſeſſes †: Therefore, *matter is a dependent being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

*Prop. 23. of this.

†Prop. 40. of this.

Corollary. From this it follows, that becauſe it was demonſtrated, in the fortieth propoſition, in the firſt book, that a time may be aſſigned

aſſigned antecedent to the exiſtence of any dependent being: And it was alſo proved by the forty fourth propoſition of the firſt book, that a time may be aſſigned poſterior to the exiſtence of every dependent being; and matter by the above propoſition being proved to be a dependent being; therefore a time may be aſſigned, antecedent and poſterior to the exiſtence of matter: wherefore the exiſtence of matter had a beginning, and matter may terminate in its exiſtence; and conſequently, matter did not exiſt from all eternity, and to all eternity may not exiſt.

It is demonſtrated from the twenty ſixth propoſition in this book, that there is only one ſelf-exiſting and independ-

dependent being, that from all eternity exiſted, and to all eternity will exiſt: That all the powers, or qualities, which that ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, are infinite, and are ſubject to no change or mutation: And from the thirty third propoſition, and its corollary, and from the thirty firſt and thirty ſecond propoſitions it has been demonſtrated, that this ſelf-exiſting and independent being is an active being, and from all eternity did act, and will continue to act to all eternity: That this ſelf exiſting and independent being, is the cauſe of bringing into exiſtence the firſt temporary being: That this ſelf-exiſting being is poſſeſſed not only of an active power, but alſo of the powers of thinking, willing, or determi-

terminating: And from the forty firſt propoſition of this book it has alſo been demonſtrated, that this ſelf-exiſting and independent being is not matter, but that matter is a temporary being, which cannot have exiſted from all eternity, and may not to all eternity exiſt.

The End of the Second Book.

THE

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Geometrically Demonſtrated.

BOOK III.

DEFINITIONS.

I. *THE* primary, *or* firſt cauſe *of beginning, continuing, or terminating the exiſtence of any being, is the determination to exert that power, the exertion whereof produces an effect, which begins, continues,*

nues, or terminates, or contributes to the beginning, continuing, or terminating the exiſtence of that being.

II. Secondary cauſes, *are all acts poſterior to the primary cauſe, tending to begin, continue, or terminate the exiſtence of a being.*

III. Knowledge, *is the diſtinct idea of the properties and relations of beings, and of their powers and qualities.*

IV. Wiſdom, *is the knowledge of the ends moſt proper to be attained, and of the means fitteſt to attain them, with the conſtant determination to attain thoſe ends, and by thoſe means.*

V.

V. Juſtice, *is the conſtant exerciſe of power according to wiſdom, or the conſtant application of power in the moſt fitting manner for the moſt proper end.*

AXIOMS.

I. *NO being can exert a power which it does not poſſeſs.*

II. *Some being is the primary cauſe of beginning, continuing, or terminating the exiſtence of every temporary or dependent being.*

III. *The exertion of any power of any being, cannot be both dependent and independent of the ſame being.*

PROPOSITION I.

THEOREM I.

If any being bring any other being into exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itſelf, but to the immediate act of another being, that being which does exert that power, is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of the other being.

LET the being A exert a power, which is not dependent upon itſelf, but upon the immediate act of ſome other being as B, and that power which A exerts brings the being C into exiſtence: I ſay, that A is not the primary cauſe



of

of beginning the exiſtence of C. For, if poſſible, let A be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence C; but the primary cauſe of the exiſtence of any being, is the determination to exert that power which brings or contributes to bring the being into exiſtence *; therefore the being A will determine the exertion of that power that brings C into exiſtence, and conſequently the exertion of that power which brings C into exiſtence, is an effect of which the determination of the being A is the cauſe ‡, but effects are dependent on the cauſes that did produce them §, therefore the exertion of that power that brings C into exiſtence, is dependent on the determination of the being A; but the exertion of the power that brings C into exi-

* Def. 1. of this.

‡ Def. 25. L. 1.

§ Ax. 11. L. 1.

ſtence, is a power that the being A exerts, which is not dependent upon A *, which is abſurd. From this abſurdity it follows, that A cannot be the primary cauſe of bringing C into exiſtence. Therefore, *if any being bring any other being into exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itſelf, but to the immediate act of ſome other being, that being which does exert the power, is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of that other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Hyp.

PRO-

PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM II.

That being that brings any other being into exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a ſelf-determining power, which is independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of that other being.

LET A repreſent a being which exerts a power that is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but by a ſelf-determining power that it poſſeſſes independent of any other being, and by the exertion of that power that A

possesses, let the being B be brought into existence: I say, that A is the primary cause of beginning the existence of B. For, if possible, let A not be the primary cause of beginning the existence of B; then because B is brought into existence by the exertion of A's power*, therefore a time may be assigned antecedent to that exertion of A's power, and consequently antecedent to the beginning of B's existence, therefore B is a temporary being†; but some being is the primary cause of the beginning of the existence of every temporary being‡, and since A is not that primary cause, therefore some other being different from A will be the primary cause of beginning B's existence, which let be C; then because the primary cause of

A ⊙
B □
C ○

* Hypoth.

† Def. 21. L. 1.

‡ Ax. 2. of this.

of the beginning of the exiſtence of any being, is the determination to exert that power which begins, or contributes to begin the exiſtence of that being *, therefore the Being C will determine the exertion of the power that begins, or contributes to begin the exiſtence of B; but the being A exerts that power †, conſequently the power that A exerts in order to begin the exiſtence of B, is the conſequence which ariſes from the determination of the being C; wherefore the exertion of A's power that begins the exiſtence of B, is an effect of which the determination of the being C is the cauſe ‡; but effects are dependent on the cauſes that did produce them §: therefore the exertion of the power of A that begins the exiſtence of B, is dependent upon the being C; but the exertion

* Def. 1. of this.

† Hyp.

‡ Def. 23. L. 1.

§ Ax. 11. L. 1.

of

of that power of A, is independent
* Hyp. of any being whatſoever *, and conſequently independent of C; therefore the exertion of the power of A that begins the exiſtence of B, is both dependent and independent of the
† Ax. 3. of this. ſame being C, which is abſurd †. From this abſurdity it follows, that no being different from A can be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B, conſequently A is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of the being B. Therefore, *that being that brings any other being into exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent on any other being but from a ſelf-determining power, which is independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of that other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION III.

THEOREM III.

The exertion of the power of that being which brings any other being into exiſtence, and is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of that other being, is dependent upon the acting of ſome other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let B be brought into exiſtence by the exertion of a power in A, but let A not be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B: I ſay, that the exertion of that power of A is dependent on the acting of ſome other being. For becauſe the beginning of B's exiſtence is an effect of which

A ⊙
B □

which the exertion of the power of
* Def. 25. L. 1. A is the cause *, and the cause of exertion of that power which is the cause of any effect, is either a self-determining power or volition in the being itself, or the immediate pressure or influence of some other being on that being that does exert
† Prop. 29. L. 1. that power †; therefore the cause of the exertion of that power of A which brings B into existence, will either be a self-determining power in the being A, or the immediate pressure or influence of some other being on A. If it be possible, let the cause of the exertion of that power of A be a self-determining power, and independent of any other being; then because that being that brings any other being into existence by the exertion of a power, which is not dependent

dent upon the acting of another being, but by a ſelf-determining power which is independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of beginning that being's exiſtence*; wherefore A will be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B, which is abſurd †; therefore the exertion of that power of A that brings B into exiſtence, is not from a ſelf-determining power, and independent of any other being, and conſequently A will exert that power by the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being ‡. Therefore, *the exertion of the power of that being which brings any other being into exiſtence, and is not the primary cauſe of beginning its exiſtence, is dependent upon the acting of ſome other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 2. of this.

† Hyp.

‡ Prop. 29. L. 2.

PRO-

PROPOSITION IV.

THEOREM IV.

The power which is exerted by that being, which is the primary cauſe of bringing any other being into exiſtence, ariſes from a ſelf-determining power which the being itſelf poſſeſſes, and independent of any other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B: I ſay, that the power that A exerts to bring B into exiſtence, is from a ſelf-determining power, and independent of any other being. For becauſe the beginning of B's exiſtence is an effect

A ⊙
B □

fect of which A is the cauſe *, there- * Hyp.
fore A will exert a power that does
bring B into exiſtence ‡; but the exer- ‡ Def. 23. L. 1.
tion of that power which is the cauſe
of any effect, is either a ſelf-deter-
mining power or volition in the be-
ing itſelf, or dependent upon the
immediate preſſure or influence of
ſome other being on that being which
exerts it †; therefore the exertion of † Prop. 29. L. 2.
that power of A which brings B into
exiſtence, is either a ſelf-determi-
ning power which A poſſeſſes, or
dependent upon the immediate pref-
ſure or influence of ſome other be-
ing. If it be poſſible, let the exer-
tion of that power in A be dependent
upon the immediate preſſure or in-
fluence of ſome other being; then
becauſe that being that brings any
other being into exiſtence by the
exertion

exertion of a power which is dependent upon the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being, cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of that other being * ; wherefore A cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B, which is abſurd† ; therefore the exertion of that power of A that brings B into exiſtence, cannot be from the immediate preſſure or influence of any other being, and conſequently that power which A exerts, and by which B is brought into exiſtence, is a ſelf-determining power, and independent of any other being. Therefore, *the power which is exerted by that being, which is the primary cauſe of bringing any other being into exiſtence, ariſes from a ſelf-determining power which the being*

* Prop. 1. of this.

† Hyp.

ing itſelf poſſeſſes, independent of any other being; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION V.

THEOREM V.

Matter cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of any being.

FOR let A be any material being which exerts a power, ſo as to bring any other being, as B, into exiſtence: I ſay, that A is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B. For becauſe matter is a dependent being*, and its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being, which let be C; therefore the

A ⊙
B □
C ○

* Prop. 41. L. 2.

exiſtence of A is an effect of which the being C is the cauſe: but effects are dependent on the cauſes that did produce them *; therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent upon C, and the exiſtence of any dependent being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being upon which its exiſtence depends †; therefore A cannot be continued in its exiſtence without being actuated by C; and conſequently, if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its exiſtence. Now becauſe A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, wherefore in thoſe points of duration in which A exerted that power which did bring B into exiſtence, it was actuated by C. Again, ſince A can exert no power without it exiſt ‡, and that exiſtence is dependent upon its

* Ax. 11. L. 1.

† Prop. 18. L. 1.

‡ Prop. 1. and 32. L. 1.

its being actuated by C, therefore the exertion of any power of A will be dependent upon its being actuated by C, and conſequently will be dependent upon the acting of C; therefore the exertion of the power of the material being A, which did bring B into exiſtence, will be dependent upon the immediate act of the being C; but that being that brings any other being into exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is dependent upon the immediate act of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of beginning its exiſtence *; wherefore the material being A is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B. Therefore, *matter cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of any being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 1. of this.

PROPOSITION VI.

THEOREM VI.

Any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of any other being.

LET A be a dependent being, which exerts a power, so as to bring any other being, as B, into existence: I say, that A is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of B. For because A is a dependent being, its existence is the effect of some other being*, which let be C; wherefore the existence of A is an effect of which C is the cause †, but effects are dependent upon the causes that did produce them ‡, therefore



* Def. 27. L. 1.

† Def. 25. L. 1.

‡ Ax. 11. L. 1.

fore the exiſtence of A is dependent upon C; but the exiſtence of any dependent being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being on which its exiſtence depends*; there- *Prop. 18. L. 1.
fore A cannot be continued in its exiſtence without being actuated by C, and conſequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its exiſtence: Now becauſe A is actuated by C in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, wherefore in theſe points of duration in which A exerted that power that did bring B into exiſtence, it muſt have been actuated by C. Again, ſince A can exert no power without it exiſt †, and that †Prop. 1. and Prop. 32. L. 1.
exiſtence is dependent on its being actuated by C; therefore the exertion of any power of A will be dependent on its being actuated by C, that

is, upon the acting of C, and conſequently the power that A did exert, which brought B into exiſtence, will be dependent upon the immediate act of C; but that being which brings any other being into exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is dependent upon the immediate act of ſome other being, cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of that other being †; wherefore A is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B.

† Prop. 1. of this.

Therefore, *any dependent being cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of any other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION VII.
THEOREM VII.

The only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of every other being.

FOR becauſe ſome being will be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of every being, which is not the ſelf-exiſting being *: I ſay, that being which is the primary cauſe, is the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For if it be poſſible for the ſelf-exiſting and independent being not to be the primary cauſe of any one dependent being, let that being be A. Now ſince ſome being is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A †, let that

* Ax. 2. of this.

† Ax. 2. of this.

beginning of existence of

that being be B, and B is not the ſelf-exiſting and independent being *, but the exiſtence of every being that is not ſelf-exiſting, is dependent on ſome other being †; wherefore the exiſtence of B is dependent on ſome other being, and conſequently the exiſtence of B is the effect of that other being upon which its exiſtence depends, therefore B is a dependent being ‡: but B is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, wherefore a dependent being may be the primary cauſe of being the exiſtence of ſome other being, which is abſurd §; therefore B cannot be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, and conſequently no being can be the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of A, but the

A ⊙
B □

* Hyp.

† Prop. 16. L. 1.

‡ Def. 27. L. 1.

§ Prop. 6. of this.

the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being. Therefore, *the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of every being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION VIII.

THEOREM VIII.

That being which continues any other being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itſelf, but upon the acting of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of continuing it in its exiſtence.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A exert a power that continues B in its exiſtence, the exertion of which power is not dependent on A, but upon the acting of ſome other

other being, which let be C: I ſay, the being A is not the primary cauſe of continuing the being B in its exiſtence.



For, if poſſible, let A be the primary cauſe that continues the being B in its exiſtence; then becauſe the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of any being, is the determination to exert that power, the exertion whereof produces an effect that continues or contributes to continue the exiſtence of that being *; therefore the being A will determine the exertion of that power that continues B in its exiſtence, and conſequently the exertion of that power which continues B in its exiſtence, is an effect of which the determination of the being A is the cauſe †: but effects are dependent upon the cauſes that did produce

* Def. 1. of this.

† Def. 25. L. 1.

produce them *; therefore the exertion of that power which continues B in its exiſtence, is dependent upon the determination of the being A; that is, the exertion of the power of A, which continues B in its exiſtence, is dependent upon A; but the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its exiſtence, is not dependent upon A †; therefore the exertion of that power of A which continues B in its exiſtence, is both dependent and independent of A, which is abſurd ‡. From that abſurdity it follows, that A cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence. Therefore, *that being which continues any being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itſelf, but upon the acting of ſome other being, is*

* Ax. 11. L. 1.

† Hyp.

‡ Ax. 3. of this.

is not the primary cause of continuing it in its existence; which was to be demonstrated.

This proposition may otherwise be demonstrated thus.

LET A and B be two beings, D, C, any portion of time, and let A exert a power that continues B in its existence by the immediate act of E: I say, that A is not the primary cause of continuing the existence of B. For because A exerts a power that does continue B in its existence *, wherefore the existence of B is dependent on A †, and therefore B cannot continue to exist without the exertion of that



* Hyp.

† Prop. 25. L. 1.

that power which A poſſeſſes to continue B in its exiſtence *, and conſequently in all the points of duration that B continues to exiſt, it will be actuated by the exertion of that power of A. Now ſince B muſt be ſucceſſively actuated in all the points of duration in which it continues to exiſt by the exertion of A's power, let any point of duration be aſſumed in the time C, D, ſuch as F, which terminates the effect of any one act or exertion of A; wherefore if at the point of duration F, A ſhould ceaſe to exert that power, the exiſtence of B would terminate in the ſame point of duration F †; but if A ſhould continue to exert that power after the point of duration F in the time F, D, then will the being B begin to be actuated by the exertion

* Prop. 18. L. 1.

† Prop. 18. L. 1.

tion of that power in the ſame point of duration F, and therefore B may be conceived in the point of duration F to begin to exiſt. Now ſince B begins to exiſt by the exertion of the power of A that is owing to the immediate act of the being E: But that being that begins the exiſtence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is owing to the immediate act of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of beginning its exiſtence *; wherefore A is not the primary cauſe of beginning the exiſtence of B, that is, A is not the primary cauſe of B's exiſtence in the point of duration F; after the ſame manner it may be demonſtrated, that A is not the primary cauſe of B's exiſting in all the other points of duration

* Prop. 1. of this.

duration in which it continues to exiſt; that is, A is not the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence, but A exerts that power that continues B in its exiſtence, by the immediate act of ſome other being. Therefore, *that being that continues any other being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power*, &c. which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION IX.

THEOREM IX.

That being which continues any other being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a ſelf-determining power which is independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of that other being.

LET A repreſent a being, which exerts a power that is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a ſelf-determining power it poſſeſſes independent of any other being, and by the exertion of that power of A let the being B be con-

continued in its exiſtence: I ſay, that A is the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence. For becauſe B continues to exiſt by the exertion of the power which A poſſeſſes *, therefore B will be actuated by the exertion of that power which A poſſeſſes in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, and conſequently by the exertion or non-exertion of that power which A poſſeſſes, B will continue or terminate in its exiſtence; therefore the continuation of B's exiſtence is an effect of which the exertion of the power which A poſſeſſes is the cauſe †: but that being whoſe exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being, is a dependent being ‡; wherefore B is a dependent being. Again,



* Hyp.

† Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

‡ Def. 27. L. 1.

becauſe B is a dependent or temporary being, ſome being will be the primary cauſe of the continuation of its exiſtence *: if poſſible, let that being be ſome other being than A, as C; then becauſe the primary cauſe of the continuation of the exiſtence of any being, is the determination to exert that power which produces an effect, which effect continues or contributes to continue the being in its exiſtence †; therefore the being C will determine the exertion of the power that continues B in its exiſtence; but the being A exerts that power ‡, conſequently the power which A exerts in order to continue C in its exiſtence, is the conſequence which ariſes from the determination of the being C; wherefore the exertion of A's power which continues B in its exiſtence,

* Ax. 2. of this.

† Def. 1. of this.

‡ Hyp.

exiſtence, is an effect of which the determination of the being C is the cauſe *: but effects are dependent upon the cauſes that did produce them †; wherefore the exertion of A's power that continues B in its exiſtence, is dependent on the being C, but the exertion of that power of A is independent of any other being whatſoever ‡, and conſequently independent of C; wherefore the exertion of A's power which continues B in its exiſtence, is both dependent and independent of the ſame being C, which is abſurd §. From this abſurdity it follows, that no being different from A can be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence, conſequently A is the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of B. Therefore, *that being*

* Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

† Ax. 11. L. 1.

‡ Hyp.

§ Ax. 3. of this.

which continues any being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being but from a ſelf-determining power it poſſeſſes independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of continuing that other being in its exiſtence; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION X.
THEOREM X.

The exertion of that power that does continue any other being in its exiſtence, and is not the primary cauſe of continuing it in its exiſtence, is dependent upon the acting of ſome other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let B be continued in its exiſtence

ſtence by the exertion of A ⊙
a power which A poſſeſſes, B □
but let A not be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence: I ſay, that the exertion of the power A, is dependent on the acting of ſome other being. For becauſe the continuation of B's exiſtence is an effect, of which the exertion of the power of A is the cauſe*, and the exertion of that power which is the cauſe of any effect, is either owing to a ſelf-determining power or volition in the being itſelf, or to the immediate preſſure and influence of ſome other being on the being that exerts it †; therefore the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its exiſtence, will either be owing to a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes, or to the immediate preſſure or influ-

* Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

† Prop. 29. L. 2.

ence of ſome other being on A. If it be poſſible, let the exertion of the power of A be a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes independent of any other being; then becauſe that being that continues any other being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power that is ſelf-determining and independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of continuing it in its exiſtence *; therefore A will be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence, which is abſurd †; wherefore the exertion of the power in A that continues B in its exiſtence, is not owing to a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes independent of any other being, and conſequently the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its exiſtence, is dependent on the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being

*Prop. 9. of this.

†Hyp.

ing that is the acting of ſome other being*. Therefore, *the exertion of the power of that being that continues any other being in its exiſtence, and which is not the primary cauſe of continuing it in its exiſtence, is dependent upon the acting of ſome other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Def. 22. and 37. L. 1.

PROPOSITION XI.

THEOREM XI.

The power that is exerted by that being which is the primary cauſe of continuing any other being in its exiſtence, ariſes from a ſelf-determining power which the being poſſeſſes, independent of any other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A be the primary cauſe of

continuing B in its exiſtence: I ſay, the power that A exerts to continue B in its exiſtence, is a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes independent of any other being. For becauſe the continuation of B's exiſtence is an effect whereof A is the cauſe*, therefore A will exert a power that does continue A in its exiſtence; but the exertion of that power that is the cauſe of an effect, is either owing to a ſelf-determining power in the being itſelf, or to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being on that being which exerts it †; therefore the exertion of the power of A that continues B in its exiſtence, is either owing to a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes, or to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other

* Hyp.

† Prop. 29. L. 2.

other being on A. If it be poſſible, let the exertion of that power which A exerts to continue B in its exiſtence, be owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being upon it; then becauſe that being that continues any other being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power which is owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being, that is by the acting of ſome other being *, is not the primary cauſe of continuing that other being in its exiſtence †; wherefore A is not the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence, which is abſurd ‡; therefore the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its exiſtence, is not owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being, and conſequently that

* Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

† Prop. 8. of this.

‡ Hyp.

that power that A exerts, and by which B is continued in its exiſtence, is a ſelf-determining power which A poſ-

* Prop. 29. L. 2. and its Cor.

ſeſſes independent of any other being*. Therefore, *if any being be the primary cauſe of continuing any other being in its exiſtence, the exertion of the power of that being by which the other being is continued in its exiſtence, is owing to a ſelf-determining power which the being poſſeſſes, independent of any other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XII.

THEOREM XII.

Matter cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of any being.

LET A be any material being that exerts a power, ſo as to continue any other being, as B, in its exiſtence: I ſay, that A cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence. For becauſe matter is a dependent being *, and its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other being †, which let be C; therefore the exiſtence of A is an effect of which the being C is the cauſe ‡: but effects are dependent



* Prop. 41. L. 2.
† Def. 27. L. 1.
‡ Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

dent upon the cauſes that did pro-
* Ax. 11. L. 1. duce them *, therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent upon C, and the exiſtence of any dependent being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being upon which
† Prop. 18 L. 1. its exiſtence depends †; therefore A cannot be continued in its exiſtence without being actuated by C; and conſequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its exiſtence. Now becauſe A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, wherefore in thoſe points of duration in which A exerts that power by which B is continued in its exiſtence, it was actuated by C. Again, ſince A can exert no power
* Prop. 1. and 32. L. 1. without it exiſt ‡, and that exiſtence is dependent upon its being actuated by C, therefore the exertion of any

power

power of A, will be dependent upon its being actuated by C, and conſequently will be dependent upon the acting of C; therefore the exertion of that power of the material being A, that does continue B in its exiſtence, is owing to the acting of the being C †; but that being which continues any other being in its exiſtence, by the exertion of a power that is dependent on the acting of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of continuing it in its exiſtence *; wherefore the material being A cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence. Therefore, *matter cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing any being in its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

† Def. 22. L. 1.

* Prop. 8. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIII.

THEOREM XIII.

Any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of continuing any other being in its existence.

LET A be a dependent being, which exerts a power, so as to continue any other being, as B, in its existence: I say, that A cannot be the primary cause of continuing B in its existence. For because A is a dependent being, its existence is the effect of some other being *, which let be C; wherefore the existence of the being A is an effect of which the being C is the cause †: but effects are dependent



* Def. 27. L. 1.

† Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

pendent upon the cauſes which did produce them*, therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent upon the being C; but the exiſtence of any being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being on which its exiſtence depends†; therefore A cannot be continued in its exiſtence without being actuated by C, and conſequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its exiſtence. Now becauſe A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, wherefore in all the points of duration in which it exerted that power that continued B in its exiſtence, it will have been actuated by C, conſequently the power that A exerts, which does continue B in its exiſtence, is owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of C, that is, to the acting

* Ax. 11. L. 1.

*Prop. 18. L. 1.

acting of C; but that being which exerts a power that does continue any other being in its exiſtence, which is owing to the acting of any other being, cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing that other being in its exiſtence*; wherefore A cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing B in its exiſtence. Therefore, *any dependent being cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing any being in its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 8. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIV.

THEOREM XIV.

The only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of every being.

FOR ſome being will be the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of every being, otherwiſe there would be an effect produced, to wit, the continuation of the being without a cauſe, which is abſurd*; wherefore ſince ſome being will be the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of every being: I ſay, that being is the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For, if it be poſſible, for the

* Ax. 2. L. 1.

only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being not to be the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of any one being, which let be A; now becauſe ſome being is the primary cauſe of the continuation of the exiſtence of A, which let be B; then ſince the being is not the ſelf-exiſting and independent being †, but the exiſtence of every being that is not ſelf-exiſting and independent, is dependent on ſome other being ‡; wherefore the exiſtence of B is dependent on ſome other being, and conſequently the exiſtence of B is the effect of ſome other being, that is, B is a dependent being *; but B is the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, wherefore a dependent being may be the

A ⊙
B □

† Hyp.

‡ Prop. 16. L. 1.

* Def. 27. L. 1.

the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of ſome other being, which is abſurd †; therefore B cannot be the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, and conſequently no being can be the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of A, but the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being. Therefore, *the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of every being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

† Prop. 13. of this.

PROPOSITION XV.

THEOREM XV.

That being, which exerts a power by the immediate act of some other being, whereby the existence of another being is terminated, that being is not the primary cause of terminating the existence of that other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A exert a power by the immediate act of some other being, as C, so as to terminate the existence of B: I say, that A is not the primary cause of terminating the existence of B. For, if possible, let A be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B; then

then becauſe the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any other being, is the determination to exert that power, the exertion whereof produces an effect, which terminates, or contributes to terminate, the exiſtence of the being *; therefore A can determine the exertion of that power which terminates the exiſtence of B, and therefore A can act in oppoſition to that power which is the primary cauſe of continuing the exiſtence of B, ſo as to deſtroy its effect; but the primary cauſe of continuing any being in its exiſtence, is the ſelf-exiſting and independent being †; wherefore A can act in oppoſition to the acting of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, ſo as to deſtroy its effect, and conſequently the exertion of that power of A is equal and

* Def. 1. of this.

† Prop. 9. of this.

contrary to the exertion of the power of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, becauſe nothing can deſtroy the exertion of that power but the exertion of one which is equal and contrary to it *. Again, becauſe A terminates the exiſtence of B, by the immediate act of C †; therefore A will be preſſed upon or influenced by C, in order to exert that power by which the exiſtence of B is terminated ‡, that is, A will be preſſed upon or influenced by the exertion of the powers or qualities of C; but any being that is preſſed upon or influenced by the exertion of the powers or qualities of another being, is a dependent being §, therefore A is a dependent being: but it has been demonſtrated, that the exertion of A's power can deſtroy the exertion of the

* Ax. 12. L. 1.

† Hyp.

‡ Def. 22. L. 1.

§ Prop. 24. L. 2.

the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, therefore the ſelf-exiſting and independent being may be influenced by the exertion of the power of the dependent being A; but any being that can be influenced by the exertion of any of the powers or qualities of another being, is a dependent being*, wherefore the ſelf-exiſting and independent being is a dependent being, which is abſurd. From this abſurdity it follows, that A cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B. Therefore, *that being which exerts a power, ſo as to terminate the exiſtence of any other being, by the immediate act of ſome other being, that being which does exert that power, is not the primary cauſe of terminating the ex-*

* Prop. 24. L. 2.

iſtence of that other being; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XVI.

THEOREM XVI.

That being which terminates the exiſtence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a ſelf-determining power which it poſſeſſes independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of that other being.

LET A repreſent a being, which exerts a power that is not dependent upon the acting of any other being but by a ſelf-determining power which it poſſeſſes independent of any

any other being, and by the exertion of that power which A poſſeſſes, let the exiſtence of the being B be terminated: I ſay, that A is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B. For, if poſſible, let A not be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B; then becauſe the exiſtence of B is terminated by the exertion of A's power *, therefore a time may be aſſigned poſterior to the termination of the exiſtence of B; but that being poſterior to whoſe exiſtence a time may be aſſigned, is a dependent being †, therefore B is a dependent being; but ſome being is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any temporary or dependent being ‡, and ſince A is not the primary



* Hyp.

† Prop. 42. L. 1.

‡ Ax. 2. of this.

primary cauſe, therefore ſome other being different from A will be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B, which let be C; then becauſe the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any being, is the determination to exert that power, the exertion whereof produces an effect, which terminates or contributes to terminate the exiſtence of that being*; therefore the being C will determine the exertion of that power which terminates the exiſtence of B, but the being A exerts that power†, conſequently the power which A exerts in order to terminate the exiſtence of B, is the conſequence which ariſes from the determination of the being C; wherefore the exertion of A's power which terminates the exiſtence of B, is an effect

* Def. 1. of this.

† Hyp.

effect of which the determination of the being C is the cauſe *; but effects are dependent on the cauſes that did produce them †, therefore the exertion of the power of A, which terminates the exiſtence of B, is dependent upon the being C; but the exertion of that power of A is independent of any being whatſoever ‡, and conſequently the exertion of that power of A, which terminates the exiſtence of B, is independent of C; therefore the exertion of that power of A, which terminates the exiſtence of B, is both dependent and independent of the ſame being C, which is abſurd §. From this abſurdity it follows, that no being different from A can be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B, conſequently A is the primary cauſe of termi-

* Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

† Ax. 11. L. 1.

‡ Hyp.

§ Ax. 3. of this.

terminating the exiſtence of B. Therefore, *that being which terminates the exiſtence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a ſelf-determining power, which it poſſeſſes independent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of that other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XVII.

THEOREM XVII.

The exertion of that power that terminates the exiſtence of any other being, but is not the primary cauſe of terminating it in its exiſtence, is owing to the immediate act of ſome other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A terminate the exiſtence of B, but is not the primary cauſe of terminating its exiſtence: I ſay, that the exertion of the power of A that does terminate B's exiſtence, is owing to the immediate act of ſome other being. For becauſe the terminating of B's exiſtence is an effect pro-

produced, of which the exertion of
* Def. 25. L. 1. the power of A is the cauſe * ; but the exertion of the power that is the cauſe of any effect, is either owing to a ſelf-determining power or volition in the being itſelf, or to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being upon the being that
† Prop. 29. L. 2. does exert that power † ; therefore the exertion of the power of A, that terminates the exiſtence of B, is either a ſelf-determining power in A, or owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being on it. If it be poſſible, let the exertion of the power of A be a ſelf-determining power, and independent of any other being ; then becauſe that being that terminates the exiſtence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is ſelf-determining and independent

pendent of any other being, is the primary cauſe of terminating its exiſtence *, wherefore A is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B, which is abſurd †; therefore the exertion of the power of A, that terminates the exiſtence of B, is not a ſelf-determining power, and independent of any other being, and therefore is owing to the preſſure or influence of ſome other being ‡, and conſequently the exertion of the power of A, which terminates the exiſtence of B, is owing to the act of ſome other being §. Therefore, *the exertion of that power that terminates the exiſtence of any other being, but is not the primary cauſe of terminating it in its exiſtence, is owing to the immediate act of ſome other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 16. of this.

† Hyp.

‡ Prop. 29. L. 2. and its Cor.

§ Def. 22. L. 1.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XVIII.

THEOREM XVIII.

The power that is exerted by that being that terminates the exiſtence of any other being, and is the primary cauſe of terminating it, is a ſelf-determining power which that being poſſeſſes, independent of any other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B: I ſay, that the power which A exerts to terminate the exiſtence of B, is a ſelf determining power which A poſſeſſes independent of any other being. For becauſe the terminating of B's exiſtence is an effect of which the exertion of the power

power that A poſſeſſes is the cauſe*; but the exertion of the power that is the cauſe of any effect, is either owing to a ſelf-determining power, and independent of any other being in the being itſelf, or to the immediate preſſure and influence of ſome other being on the being that exerts it†; therefore that power that A exerts for the terminating of the exiſtence of B, is either a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes, or is owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being on A. And, if poſſible, let the exertion of that power of A, by which the exiſtence of B is terminated, be owing to the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being on A; then becauſe the act of any being is the exertion of that power by which it preſſes upon

* Def. 25. L. 1.

† Prop 29. L. 2.

or influences itſelf or any other being *, therefore the exertion of the power of A, which terminates the exiſtence of B, is owing to the immediate act of ſome other being; but any being that terminates the exiſtence of any other being by the exertion of a power that is owing to the immediate act of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of terminating its exiſtence †; therefore A cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B, which is abſurd ‡; conſequently the power that A exerts, for the terminating of B's exiſtence, is a ſelf-determining power which A poſſeſſes, independent of any other being. Therefore, *if any being be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any other being, the power that it exerts for the termi-*

* Def. 22. L. 1.

† Prop. 15. of this.

‡ Hyp.

termination of that other being's exiſtence, is a ſelf-determining power, which it poſſeſſes independent of any other being; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XIX.

THEOREM XIX.

Matter cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any being.

LET A be any material being, which exerts a power, ſo as to terminate the exiſtence of any other being, as B: I ſay, A cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence



of the being B. For becauſe matter
* Prop. 41. L. 2. is a dependent being *, and its exiſtence is the effect of ſome other be-
† Def. 27. L. 1. ing †, which let be C; therefore the exiſtence of the material being A is an effect, of which the being C is the
‡ Def. 23. and 25. L. 1. cauſe ‡: but effects are dependent upon the cauſes that did produce
§ Ax. 11. L. 1. them §; therefore the exiſtence of A is dependent upon C, and the exiſtence of any dependent being cannot be continued, without being actuated by that being upon which its exiſtence
‖ Prop. 18. L. 1. depends ‖; therefore A cannot be continued in its exiſtence, without being actuated by C, and conſequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its exiſtence. Now becauſe A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, where-

wherefore in theſe points of duration, in which A exerted that power that terminated the exiſtence of B, it was actuated by C. Again, ſince A can exert no power without it exiſt *, and that exiſtence is dependent upon its being actuated by C; therefore the exertion of any power of A, will be dependent upon its being actuated by C, and conſequently will be dependent upon the immediate acting of C; therefore the exertion of that power of the material being A, that terminated the exiſtence of C, is dependent upon the immediate act of C; but any being that terminates the exiſtence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is dependent upon the

* Prop. 1. and Prop. 32. L. 1.

immediate act of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of that other being‡; therefore the material being A is not the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B. Therefore, *matter cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

‡Prop. 15. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XX.

THEOREM XX.

A dependent being cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any being.

LET A be a dependent being, which exerts a power, ſo as to terminate the exiſtence of B: I ſay, that A is not the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of B. For becauſe A is a dependent being, its exiſtence is the effect on ſome other being*, which let be C; but the exiſtence of any dependent being cannot be continued, without being actuated by that being on which its exiſtence depends †; there-



* Def. 27. L. 1.

† Prop. 18. L. 1.

of

therefore A cannot continue in its exiſtence, without being actuated by C. Now becauſe A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exiſts, wherefore in theſe points of duration, in which it terminates the exiſtence of B, it will be actuated by C, and conſequently the power that A exerts, for the terminating of B's exiſtence, will be dependent upon the preſſure or influence of C, that is, to the acting of C *; but that being that exerts a power, ſo as to terminate the exiſtence of any other being, by the immediate preſſure or influence of ſome other being, that is, by the immediate act of ſome other being, is not the primary cauſe of terminating its exiſtence †; wherefore the dependent being A is not the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence

* Def. 22. L. 1.

† Prop. 15. of this.

exiſtence of the being B. Therefore, *a dependent being cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any other being*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXI.

THEOREM XXI.

The only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of every being.

FOR ſome being will be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of every being that does or will terminate *; wherefore ſince ſome being will be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of every being that did, does, or will terminate

* Ax. 2. of this.

nate in its exiſtence: I ſay, that being which is the primary cauſe of theſe effects, is the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being. For if it be poſſible for the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, not to be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any one being, let that being be A, and let B be the primary cauſe of terminating its exiſtence; then becauſe B is not the ſelf-exiſting and independent being *; but the exiſtence of every being that is not ſelf-exiſting and independent, is dependent on ſome other being †; wherefore the exiſtence of B is dependent on ſome other being, and its exiſtence will be the effect of that other being, upon which its exiſtence depends; wherefore B is a de-

A ⊙
B □

* Hyp.

† Prop. 16. L. 1.

a dependent being*: but any dependent being cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of any other being †, therefore B cannot be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A; and after the ſame manner it may be demonſtrated, that no being can be the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of A, but the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being. Therefore, *the only one ſelf-exiſting and independent being, is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of every being, that ever did, does, or will terminate in its exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Def. 27. L. 1.

† Prop. 20. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXII.

THEOREM XXII.

The ſelf-exiſting and independent being is poſſeſſed of knowledge.

FOR ſince knowledge is the diſtinct idea of the properties and relations of being, and of their powers and qualities *; if it were poſſible for the ſelf-exiſting and independent being not to have a diſtinct idea of the properties and relations of beings, and of their powers or qualities, then the powers or qualities which a ſelf-exiſting and independent being poſſeſſes, could be augmented in order to receive a diſtinct idea of the properties and the relations of beings, and of their powers

* Def. 3. of this.

powers or qualities, which is abſurd*. From this abſurdity it follows, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being does poſſeſs a diſtinct idea of the properties and relations of beings, and of their powers or qualities, which is knowledge†. Therefore, *the ſelf-exiſting and independent being is poſſeſſed of knowledge*; which was to be demonſtrated.

*Prop. 13. L. 2.

† Def. 3. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXIII.

THEOREM XXIII.

The ſelf-exiſtent and independent being can uſe the propereſt means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into exiſtence.

LET A repreſent the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being, and B any other being: I ſay, that A can uſe the propereſt means for producing the exiſtence of B; for if A cannot uſe the propereſt means for producing the exiſtence of B, then will the powers or qualities which A poſſeſſes, have certain limits or boundaries; but A is the ſelf-exiſting and inde-

A ⊙
B □

independent being, and the powers or qualities it poſſeſſes have no limits or boundaries *, conſequently the powers of A are limited and not limited, which is abſurd; wherefore A can uſe the propereſt means for bringing the being B into exiſtence, or for producing of any effect. Therefore, *the ſelf-exiſting and independent being can uſe the propereſt means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

* Prop. 17. L. 2.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXIV.

THEOREM XXIV.

The ſelf-exiſtent and independent being, conſtantly uſes the moſt proper means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into exiſtence.

FOR by the twenty ſecond propoſition of this book the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being knows the moſt proper means for producing any effect, and the powers or qualities of the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being admit of no change or mutation *; therefore the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being either conſtantly does, or never can uſe the moſt proper means to produce any effect,

* Prop. 15. L. 2.

effect, or for bringing any being into exiſtence, becauſe if the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being ſometimes did not uſe the moſt proper means, and at other times did, then the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being would change, which is abſurd *; but the ſelf-exiſtent being can uſe the moſt proper means for producing any effect †.

* Prop. 15. L. 2.

† Prop. 23. of this.

Therefore, *the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being, conſtantly uſes the moſt proper means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into exiſtence*; which was to be demonſtrated.

PROPOSITION XXV.

THEOREM XXV.

The ſelf-exiſting and independent being is poſſeſſed of wiſdom.

BEcauſe the ſelf-determining power of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being is the primary cauſe of beginning, continuing, or terminating the exiſtence of every being that ever did or can exiſt, or that ever did or will terminate in its exiſtence *; therefore the beginning, continuing, or terminating the exiſtence of every being that ever did or can exiſt, or ever did or will terminate, are effects produced of which the ſelf-determining power of the ſelf-exiſting and independent being

* Prop. 7, 14, and 21 of this.

is

is the cauſe: but the ſelf-determining power is the power of acting according to the will *, which is the determination of acting †; therefore the primary cauſe of beginning, continuing, or terminating the exiſtence of every being that ever did or can exiſt, or that ever did or will terminate in its exiſtence, is the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being's determination to act; and the ſelf-exiſtent and independent being is poſſeſſed of knowledge ‡, and therefore knows the ends moſt proper to be attained, and the fitteſt means to attain them: but the ſelf-exiſting and independent being always uſes the propereſt means for the producing of any effect §; therefore the ſelf-exiſting and independent being has the knowledge of the ends

* Def. 4. L. 2.
† Def. 3. L. 2.
‡ Prop. 22. of this.
§ Prop. 24. of this.

most proper to be attained, and of the fittest means to attain them, and constantly determines to attain the most proper ends by the fittest means; but the knowledge of the ends most proper to be attained, and of the means fittest to attain them, with the constant determination to attain those ends by those means is wisdom *. Therefore, *the self-existing and independent being is possessed of wisdom*; which was to be demonstrated.

* Def. 4. of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXVI.

THEOREM XXVI.

The ſelf-exiſting and independent being is poſſeſſed of juſtice.

BEcauſe the ſelf-exiſting and independent being conſtantly uſes the moſt proper means for producing of any effect*; therefore the ſelf-exiſting and independent being conſtantly makes the application of power in the moſt fitting manner, for the moſt proper end, or the ſelf-exiſting and independent being conſtantly exerts power according to wiſdom; but the conſtant exerciſe of power according to wiſdom, or the conſtant

*Prop. 24. of this.

conſtant application of power in the moſt fitting manner for the moſt proper end is juſtice †. Therefore, *the ſelf-exiſting and independent being is poſſeſſed of juſtice*; which was to be demonſtrated.

† Def. 5. of this.

From the ſeventh, fourteenth, and twenty firſt propoſitions of this book it is demonſtrated, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being, which from eternity did, and to eternity will exiſt, is the primary cauſe of bringing into exiſtence every being that ever did or can exiſt, that on him the continuation of their exiſtence depends, and that he is the primary cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of every being that ever did or will terminate in its exiſtence; and alſo from the twenty

twenty ſecond, twenty fourth, twenty fifth, and twenty ſixth propoſitions it is demonſtrated, that the ſelf-exiſting and independent being conſtantly uſes the moſt proper means for producing of any effect, that he is poſſeſſed of knowledge, wiſdom, and juſtice.

That ſelf-exiſting and independent being, which from eternity did, and to eternity will exiſt, who is an active being, and all of whoſe powers or qualities are infinite, and incapable of any change or mutation, who determines, wills, and thinks; who is poſſeſſed of power, knowledge, wiſdom, juſtice, &c. *who brought matter, and all other beings that ever did or can exiſt, into exiſtence, upon whom*

whom the continuation of their exiſtence depends, and who is the cauſe of terminating the exiſtence of every being that ever did or will exiſt, *I call* GOD, BLESSED FOR EVER, to whom be aſcribed all glory, honour, praiſe, power, and dominion, for ever and ever. Amen.

ice